



CONFLICT SENSITIVITY *in* EMERGENCIES

Learning from the Asia Tsunami Response

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*The authors wish to dedicate this paper to the memory
of the children, women and men who have lost their lives
under tragic circumstances - and those that have survived.*

*This paper will serve as a reminder of the fragility and tenacity
of our shared human lives, and the privilege of serving.*

*May we never give up the quest for learning as we seek
to make ever more effective contributions in building a better tomorrow.*

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GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	- Area Development Programme
ATRT	- Asia Tsunami Response Team (World Vision)
CBO	- Community-Based Organization
CS	- Conflict Sensitivity
DNH	- Do No Harm (also known as Local Capacities for Peace)
HEA	- Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs
IDPP	- Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan
iPAD	- Integrating Peacebuilding and Development
LEAP	- Learning Through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning
MSTC	- Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts
NO	- National Office (World Vision)
Pax Net	- WV's internal staff peacebuilding network
PCIA	- Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
VACA	- Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis
WV	- World Vision

I. Summary of findings:

This paper uses the first year of the Asia Tsunami Response as a timely window to reflect on World Vision's recent operational experience with conflict sensitivity in emergency response, and to identify potential directions for such work in the future. It uses six Asia-Pacific case studies, from both tsunami response programmes and previous emergency responses, to inform a series of learning discussions among staff.

Conflict sensitivity has evolved over the past decade as an approach to improving the quality and accountability of humanitarian and development assistance programmes in zones vulnerable to destructive conflict, including both violent conflict and latent (or emerging) tensions vulnerable to escalation. Conflict sensitivity is defined as “the ability of your organisation to understand the context in which you operate, understand the interaction between your intervention and the context, and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts” (International Alert et al. 2004:1,1). 'Doing no harm' is considered a minimal standard, distinct from active peacebuilding.

■ WORLD VISION EXPERIENCE PRE-TSUNAMI

WV's emergency response staff networks took up Do No Harm / Local Capacities for Peace (DNH) as a foundational conflict sensitivity tool in 1997. However from 2000 to 2005, most activity and learning took place in community development programmes. Emergency response applications during this time were rare, but examples of good practice in small-scale disasters are available. These include the following:

● **North Maluku, Indonesia Conflict Emergency Response 2000-2004.** In the first phase of response, WV leaders applied DNH analysis to strategically position their food and health assistance in ways that restored connections between Christian and Muslim communities. This also laid groundwork for active peacebuilding projects during the subsequent rehabilitation phase.

● **Mindanao, Philippines Support to Conflict Evacuees 2003.** In the first phase of response, rapid relief response staff used their existing DNH skills and local knowledge to plan distribution of food and non-food items in ways that demonstrated respect for the culture and values of Muslim beneficiaries, in a context of significant Christian-Muslim tension.

● **Cambodia Drought Response 2004.** Conflict assessments during the preparedness phase informed improved beneficiary selection processes, in order to mitigate latent political tensions at the community level. Relief and conflict sensitivity staff also collaborated to pilot a Rapid Social Impact Evaluation.

These pre-tsunami cases illustrate that conflict sensitivity is possible in the early phases of emergency response if the organization is prepared. Key preparedness factors include having up-to-date conflict assessment data available, and developing the conflict sensitivity capacities of key staff.

■ CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN WV ASIA TSUNAMI RESPONSE

The World Vision Asia Tsunami Response Team (ATRT) commissioned multi-country conflict assessments within the

first ten weeks of operation, hired five advisors and trained thirteen resource persons within approximately the first year, marking a new level of conflict sensitivity effort in large-scale emergency response. This effort focused on pursuing consistency in 'doing no harm' as a minimal standard. Shelter reconstruction has been a priority sector, due to its large scope and significant risk of unintentionally exacerbating conflict in the tsunami-affected contexts. Methodology has included a combination of DNH micro-assessment and Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC) macro-analysis. Many of WV's development-influenced conflict sensitivity tools and processes were adapted for use in relief.

- The **Sri Lanka Tsunami Response** in year one established 'do no harm' as a guiding principle, and focused on equity issues in targeting benefits. District-level Stakeholder Representatives integrated DNH into household assessments at shelter project sites, which improved beneficiary verification. In year two, all resettlement sites underwent conflict assessment in conjunction with the programme-wide baseline, actions plans were established for each site, and monitoring indicators were established. Challenges included pressure for quick results, equity in beneficiary targeting, staff recruitment, and the changing 'buffer zone' policy.

- The **Aceh, Indonesia Tsunami Response** in year one established a preliminary shelter strategy that reflected conflict assessment findings, and a creative arts project that aimed to restore resilience. In year two, conflict sensitivity staff provided DNH assessment and advisory support for zonal shelter implementation, and monitoring indicators were established. Macro-analysis were updated to reflect the current peace process. Zonal and sectoral staff were trained as DNH practitioners. Challenges included staffing rotation and recruitment, competing initiatives and limited 'organizational space,' and limited access to conflict assessment reports.

- The **India Tsunami Response** experience has been unique, as contextual tensions are latent and structural in nature, including marginalization of vulnerable groups. Conflict

sensitivity staff were hired more quickly than in the other country programme, which led to an earlier uptake of assessment findings. Programmes design applications included diversification of economic recovery plans, permanent shelter guidelines emphasizing vulnerable groups, gender and psychosocial support. Challenges included lack of macro-analysis, loss of conflict sensitivity staff, uncertain monitoring of shelter guidelines, and ongoing staff awareness raising on latent tensions.

Overall, in the first year, conflict sensitivity contributed to shelter at the conceptual level, but it did not influence strategic positioning or programme design as significantly as was intended. Instead, the first year became a valuable period of awareness raising, capacity building and conflict assessment in preparation for year two. Year two reflects a more significant conflict sensitivity influence in shelter design, monitoring and evaluation, and some expansion to other sectors. There were advances in methodology, such as adapting community development tools for use in relief, linking micro- and macro-analysis, and integrating conflict sensitivity with other assessments, field implementation tools, and phases of the DME cycle.

These outcomes represent significant organizational progress. Nonetheless, for continued improvement, WV must ask itself why conflict sensitivity did not have a more significant influence during the critical early phases of the tsunami response. Hindering factors identified in this paper include the following:

- *Lack of conflict sensitivity work (such as conflict assessment and capacity building) during the disaster preparedness phase.*
- *Incomplete decision-making and implementation of conflict assessment findings, due to inconsistent management review and resource person follow-up.*
- *Competing initiatives and limited 'organizational space.' In particular, WV's six cross-cutting themes compete with each other, and synergies are missed.*

- *Limited awareness of conflict sensitivity and sharing of assessment findings.*
- *Recruitment delays and shortage of conflict sensitivity staff.*

These learnings indicate that WV is grappling with the risk of organizational overload associated with the 'new humanitarianism.' This does not imply that our obligation to 'do no harm' can be de-emphasized. Rather, it implies the need for clear priorities, and streamlining of conflict sensitivity practice in the early phases of emergency response.

■ POTENTIAL DIRECTIONS

This section combines promising practices, as seen in the Asia cases, with untested projections of how we might overcome the challenges encountered in tsunami response. Conflict sensitivity and relief practitioners have collaborated to identify these directions. Thus the resulting insights do not necessarily represent a 'purist' perspective on either discipline, but rather a pragmatic effort to identify what works in promoting programme quality in challenging operational contexts.

Phase I: Disaster Preparedness. Conflict sensitivity work in disaster preparedness is currently very limited. Within National Offices, preparedness could be improved as follows:

- Context analysis can include vulnerability to violent conflict, latent tensions and escalation. This informs the National Office strategy and Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan. Further, conflict sensitivity can strengthen community-based disaster mitigation.
- If conflict is identified as a significant risk, then conflict sensitivity assessments and capacity building should support ongoing community development programming. The existing assessment data can be utilized quickly at the onset of emergency.

In terms of global preparedness, there is potential to:

- Increase the number of deployable conflict sensitivity resource persons, with focus on the Regional Relief Teams.
- Orient relief managers and rapid responders to conflict sensitivity concepts, and provide them with a list of qualified resource persons and sample recruitment templates.
- Train selected rapid responders and sector staff to practice DNH within the scope of their own role.

Phase 2: Rapid Response. If conflict sensitivity work is done in the preparation phase, then minimalist approaches to conflict sensitivity are feasible in the rapid response phase. Previous conflict assessment data can inform decisions from the earliest stage. Rapid responders trained as DNH practitioners can apply this 'lens' within their own role. The focus during this phase is on identifying the most dangerous social division and avoiding actions that exacerbate it.

If there was no conflict sensitivity foundation established during the preparedness phase, then there are remedial actions that can and should be attempted, such as seeking conflict assessment data from secondary sources, and expediting the deployment of conflict sensitivity resource persons. However such remedial actions appear to have limited effectiveness, and missing conflict sensitivity during the Rapid Response Phase comes at a high cost in terms of potentially negative impacts on conflict. This reality points again to the importance of conflict sensitivity during the Disaster Preparedness Phase.

Phase 3: Strategic Re-Positioning and Planning. Timing varies, but there is a consistently recognized shift when rapid response begins to give way to forward planning. Where conflict is a high-risk priority, conflict sensitivity should be under way at the time of strategic re-positioning, in order to inform far-reaching decisions such as the selection of operating zones, sectors, target groups and partners. If conflict sensitivity work

was not conducted during the Rapid Response phase, then Strategic Re-positioning also presents an opportunity for course correction.

However, one challenge to decisive action is that prioritization among WV's six cross-cutting themes¹ is not always clear. This requires solid context analysis, which is acknowledged as the backdrop of WV's design, monitoring and evaluation framework but is significantly underdeveloped. There is significant interest in piloting Integrated Context Analysis, to assess the risk of violent and latent conflict together with other cross-cutting themes, allowing the themes to be prioritized and sequenced, so that key contextual issues can inform early phase positioning and programme design.

If conflict is identified as a priority, the programme should begin stand-alone conflict assessments, synchronized with the design, monitoring and evaluation cycle. Conflict assessment is not complete until managers have made decisions on the recommendations. Once made, these decisions can be integrated in multiple ways into programme design, monitoring and evaluation. If conflict is not the priority in a given context, it should continue to receive lower-level attention as a secondary theme.

Phase 4: Ongoing Implementation and Redesign. At this point conflict sensitivity work can become more routinised. Where conflict is a priority, stand-alone assessments continue in synchronization with the design, monitoring and evaluation cycle, and respond when 'hot spots' arise in the field. Where possible, at least one full time advisor is hired, and part-time resource persons may be developed in the field programme sites. DNH capacity building for community-based organizations, and integration of peacebuilding activities, can support the transition toward community development.

■ IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD VISION

In consultative discussions on these findings, relief and conflict sensitivity staff have consistently identified three key

opportunities as most relevant to the current 'felt needs' of WV practitioners.

1. *Emphasize conflict sensitivity in the Disaster Preparedness Phase.*
2. *Develop and test the possibility of Integrated Context Analysis.*
3. *Nurture a 'culture of analysis' within the organization.*

At the technical level, such opportunities would require a more focused collaboration between key practitioner groups within in the organization, as well as a cross-functional approach to developing and testing tools for Integrated Context Analysis. At the institutional level, staff have highlighted the need to systematize relief programme decision making that is based on field evidence, in order to increase the 'organizational space' available for reflection and decision making on conflict sensitivity and related cross-cutting issues of programme quality. If pursued, such opportunities would help to move WV toward future emergency responses that replicate and improve upon the conflict sensitivity progress shown in these case studies.

¹Peacebuilding, gender, disability, protection, environment and Christian commitment.

II. Introduction

In just over ten years, 'conflict sensitivity' has grown from a nascent concern to become a comprehensive approach for improving the quality and accountability of humanitarian and development assistance programme in zones that are vulnerable to destructive conflict. At this juncture, conflict sensitivity can best be defined as (International Alert et al. 2004:1,1):

“the ability of your organisation to:

- *understand the context in which you operate;*
- *understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and*
- *act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.”*

It is clear that humanitarian agencies need management strategies for coping with violent conflict in their areas of operation. Since 1990, an increasing percentage of the world's wars are internal conflicts that affect, and are affected by, the operation of emergency response and community development programmes. It is no longer considered acceptable, and in many locations no longer possible, to ignore the reality of violent conflict. Likewise, latent (or emerging) tensions are increasingly recognized for their potential to hinder the development prospects of vulnerable groups, or to escalate into violence.

At the same time, conflict sensitivity strategies must be developed with a keen eye towards the actual situations encountered during programme implementation. For many organizations,

conflict sensitivity is one among an expanding handful of important themes such as gender, environment, etc, which compete for attention during emergencies, when organizational capacity is strained to keep up. In this 'new humanitarianism,' there is a growing risk of organizational overload, which leads to 'talking conflict sensitivity' without actually 'doing conflict sensitivity.'

These issues are of critical importance to World Vision, which is increasingly committed to conflict sensitivity at the level of both policy and implementation. The Indian Ocean tsunami marked a turning point in which World Vision addressed conflict sensitivity earlier and more comprehensively than in any previous large-scale emergency response, in an effort to consistently uphold 'do no harm' as a minimal standard. Thus the tsunami response programme, particularly during its first year, has become an appropriate window for organizational learning.

The primary objective of this paper is to reflect on recent operational experience and identify both promising practices and shortcomings in the integration of conflict sensitivity in emergency response. This will help inform World Vision capacity building and management decisions in the coming years. Secondly, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to ongoing learning at the interagency level, and among our peer practitioners.

The paper is built around six brief programmatic case studies from the Asia-Pacific Region, including three from the tsunami and three from prior emergency responses. The cases were written by conflict sensitivity advisors from the country

programmes, using a format provided by the lead author. Regional staff with expertise in conflict sensitivity and relief analysed the cases and made the preliminary identification of promising practices and shortcomings.

At that point, the lead author circulated the preliminary findings among World Vision emergency response, field operations and conflict sensitivity staff, to foster discussion on potential future directions and organizational implications. Particularly significant were informal discussions held during the WV International Pax Net (peacebuilding) meeting in the Dominican Republic in March 2006, and a Practice Group session held at the WV Global Relief Forum in Cyprus in May 2006. Other staff provided input by via e-mail.

This collaborative process became a learning opportunity for many of the contributors. Specialists in conflict sensitivity or relief are naturally prone to work within the evolving assumptions of their own disciplines. Some of our assumptions were narrow and even incompatible, and these were challenged in healthy ways as we worked together. Thus the resulting conclusions do not necessarily represent a 'purist' perspective on either conflict sensitivity or relief, but rather a pragmatic effort to identify what works in promoting programme quality in challenging operational contexts. Nonetheless it must be acknowledged that conflict sensitivity staff did the bulk of the writing, so this voice predominates.

This paper is limited in that all cases are drawn from the Asia-Pacific Region. It can contribute to global learning, with the understanding that other regions will also have valuable insights. In particular, the authors acknowledge World Vision's recent conflict sensitivity efforts in emergency contexts such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uganda and Sudan. Further, the paper provides a programme-level view of conflict sensitivity, which highlights many, but not all, of the challenges of institutional mainstreaming. Complementary analyses of WV's institutional mainstreaming can be found in the writings of Abikök Riak (2006) and Allen Harder (2006).

III. INTER-AGENCY DEVELOPMENTS IN CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

Over the past ten years there has been a proliferation of methods and tools adopted for conflict-sensitive programming in aid delivery. Many toolkits and manuals have been produced, and the academic discussion of this area is lively. Increasingly, both practitioners and academics agree that humanitarian aid programmes have the potential to exacerbate conflict, and under some circumstances to contribute indirectly to conflict mitigation. This section briefly surveys the current status of conflict sensitivity practice, and relates it to developments in the broader debate around the 'new humanitarianism.'

The conflict sensitivity discussion is underpinned by a perception that the nature of violent conflict has changed. In the post-Cold War 1990s there was increased visibility of identity-related civil conflicts within states, whose localized manifestations draw in both civilian communities and aid providers. In many regions aid agencies were considered complicit in exacerbating long-running 'dirty wars' and 'complex emergencies.' The 1994 Rwanda refugee crisis is considered a pivotal example, in which genocide perpetrators re-organized and re-armed inside NGO-supported refugee camps in neighboring Zaire (Congo), contributing to subsequent instability in both countries (Eriksson 1997). Conflict sensitivity also involves a reading of crisis situations that relates aid back to politics. There is a shift away from purely 'technical' service delivery, toward a discussion of underlying causes, which are often political in nature.

Because of their apparent relationship, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches are sometimes discussed together. The World Bank (2005) distinguishes between conflict-sensitive humanitarian interventions and peacebuilding work. Conflict

sensitivity means taking responsibility for the unintended negative consequences of traditional aid programmes, in order to 'do no harm.' Peacebuilding is characterized by specialized activities that address political transformation and preventive diplomacy. Thus conflict sensitivity improves aid programme quality while working 'in conflict,' but peacebuilding changes the nature of the programme itself in order to work directly 'on conflict.'

For purposes of this paper, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding are considered distinct approaches. They are linked, in that conflict sensitivity work can lay a foundation for peacebuilding by raising staff awareness and helping to position the agency as an impartial actor. In fact, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding can be viewed as overlapping approaches occupying the two ends of a spectrum. Nonetheless, the distinction is an important one, particularly for decision making in relief operations, where conflict sensitivity is seen as an improvement to the existing programme, but peacebuilding is seen as expanding the programme with significant management implications.

The genesis of conflict sensitivity lies in 'Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment' (PCIA) as developed by Kenneth Bush (1998) and others in the mid-1990s. PCIA is based on conflict analysis as the means to understand the unique, dynamic context that is present in each location, and the interaction between the aid programme and the context. PCIA uses a wide variety of methodologies, including those that assess how humanitarian projects are affected by conflict as well as the impact of projects on conflict. PCIA is used for project design as well as monitoring and post-project evaluations (Austin et al. 2003).

The 'Do No Harm'² methodology, created through the facilitation of Mary B. Anderson (1999) of the Collaborative for Development Action, can be viewed as a PCIA tool. However it merits special attention due to its unique development process and wide-ranging influence in the humanitarian field. Through interagency collaborative learning, the DNH Project used field-based relief case studies to open up practical thinking about resource transfers, the implicit ethical messages sent by aid workers, and their impact on conflict. The lessons learned are summarized in a well-known graphical framework (see Annex A) and a step-by-step guide to analysis. While acknowledging the structural causes of conflict, DNH often places more emphasis on the behaviors and motivations of social groups.

In subsequent years, both Bush and Anderson have stayed active in the field, and become more vocal on macro-level issues. Bush sees PCIA as a fundamentally political process, criticizing the contradictions when PCIA is applied at a micro level by Northern donors, while at the macro level the same governments take actions that negate their peacebuilding rhetoric (in Austin et al. 2003). Anderson has extended her work into areas of peacebuilding, through the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (2003). In measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding work, she emphasizes that individual, micro-level changes should contribute to macro-level change in the public sphere.

This increased attention to the macro level was reflected in - and perhaps catalyzed by - a wave of research on the economic drivers of conflict. Philippe Le Billon's paper *The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know (2000)* was particularly influential. Le Billon moves beyond DNH, with an analysis of the shifting patterns in the production and distribution of wealth and power, noting that wars produce both 'winners' and 'losers.' This approach requires analyzing 'greed' in addition to identity-related 'grievances'³. Acting on this understanding can make aid more conflict-sensitive, and also improve the design and delivery of livelihood support. Le

Billon also argues for broader action by foreign governments and multilateral agencies.

The early PCIA efforts have resulted in an ever-increasing range of adaptations and off-shoots. This is an expression of how intensely NGOs have engaged with the idea of conflict sensitivity, and have adapted existing approaches to the nature of their own work. International Alert and five partner agencies⁴ have consolidated these learnings, and promoted use of the term 'conflict sensitivity.' This addresses the concern that 'peace' and 'conflict' are not necessarily opposite and mutually exclusive positions but have co-existing, overlapping elements. It reflects the emergence of a more sophisticated approach that allows for analysis of 'latent' or 'emerging' conflict, and highlights the importance of preventing violence and enhancing community resilience. Additionally, it was felt that PCIA was becoming merely a set of tools, while a more encompassing, process-based approach was needed (De la Haye and Moyroud 2003).

International Alert and its partners have supported the release of a five-part Resource Pack intended to support training and implementation of conflict-sensitive aid programming. It offers various tools for conflict analysis, as applied to programme design, monitoring and evaluation. Additionally, the Resource Pack argues that there is a need to build institutional capacity within aid organizations, because "all practitioners at all levels are both impacted by, and can impact, the development of their institution's capacity for conflict sensitivity" (International Alert 2004:5,1).

There is evidence of an increasing maturity in the conflict sensitivity literature. Conflict sensitivity is increasingly seen as a cross-cutting approach, similar to gender equity and environmental sustainability. It requires institutional capacity throughout the whole programme life-cycle, and not just an 'add-on.' Conflict sensitivity is seen not only as 'a good thing'; there are attempts to evaluate its success with the development of appropriate criteria. There is also a growing understanding of

²"Do No Harm" is often called by the alternate name "Local Capacities for Peace." Many WV staff members know this tool as "LCP." This paper uses the term "Do No Harm" or "DNH," because it is the most accurate in early phases of emergency response, and it aligns with current interagency usage. ³At one time, there was significant debate over whether 'greed' or 'grievance' was the most important cause of civil conflict. Increasingly, researchers now agree that both causes are valid and often inter-related.

⁴International Alert, Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum of Early Warning and Response, and Saferworld.

the components of institutional mainstreaming, such as institutional commitment, organizational culture and institutional structures, capacity development, external relationships and accountability (International Alert et al. 2004:5,17).

Nonetheless, Adam Barbolet and other authors involved in developing the Resource Pack have noted that despite a flow-ering of methodologies and toolkits, most agencies still do not use any conflict-related tools at all and conflict-sensitive approaches have yet to be mainstreamed. The authors attribute this situation to an overabundance of new agency initiatives, and to a general conceptual ambiguity around the key concepts of PCIA (Barbolet et al. 2005). Within the literature, several key debates emerge:

- The tension between codifying these approaches while remaining 'sensitive' to the local situation
- The risk of minimizing constructive conflicts - e.g. those that promote justice through nonviolent means - due to misinterpretation of the 'do no harm' maxim
- Whether aid agencies have been technocratic in applying conflict sensitivity, thereby missing the primacy of engagement with local actors
- Whether, in a crisis situation, 'doing no harm' is realistic, or whether the focus should be on doing more good than harm (the 'net benefit approach')
- Whether, in situations of chronic instability or injustice, 'doing no harm' is sufficient, or aid workers must strive to 'do some good'
- Whether the impacts of conflict sensitivity can be objectively measured

The conflict sensitivity discussion has had wide-ranging impacts and has influenced the approaches of large donors. Bilateral and multilateral players have incorporated conflict-sensitive language into their work and have adopted structured

approaches to conflict analysis. The most influential frameworks include those developed by DFID, USAID and the World Bank. However large donors are still criticised for failing to engage with community actors. The private sector has also begun to consider conflict sensitivity as a part of their corporate social responsibility, with guides and manuals available from International Alert (2005).

Conflict sensitivity cannot be considered in isolation, for it is linked to the ongoing expansion of humanitarian aid into non-traditional sectors. This line of thinking has been in process since the early 1990s, as aid agencies began seeking new approaches to mitigate the various ways in which relief aid could be unintentionally damaging to its recipients. Practitioners began to discuss 'developmental relief' as an approach to relief work that includes some of the goals of sustainable development. Relief and community development were conceived as occupying two ends of a continuum. Thus short-term relief programmes were adapted to include some longer-term developmental goals such as reducing underlying vulnerabilities and building human capacity (Mancino et al. 2001; Campanaro et al. 2002).

More recently, discussion of 'developmental relief' has given way to the 'new humanitarianism.' This refers to the ongoing expansion of humanitarianism into non-traditional sectors such as advocacy and peacebuilding. The emphasis on underlying causes raises issues of justice and human rights, which move humanitarian action toward the realm of politics. This is linked to an increasing tendency toward international interventionism, in which national sovereignty may be overridden by humanitarian concerns. There is a lively debate regarding whether the new humanitarianism is conceptually and ethically sound, and whether it is operationally practical.

At the conceptual and ethical level, critics imply that conflict sensitivity, with its links to peacebuilding and the 'new humanitarianism', may be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Macrae and Leader (2000) point out that the 'new

humanitarianism' is linked to the increasing 'coherence' between Northern donors' political agendas and their humanitarian assistance, resulting in the politicization of aid. Thus Macrae and Leader propose that distinct and complementary roles would be preferable to 'coherence.' Mark Duffield (2001) further argues that under the Post-Cold War international system, poverty has been recast as a security issue, and the resulting expansion of development to include peacebuilding provides justification for unprecedented social engineering within societies. At the same time, NGOs attempt to use localized aid to address global patterns of exclusion, thus perpetuating the hegemony of Northern aid donors at the international level.

David Rieff brought this debate to wider public attention in *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (2002). Rieff criticises NGO support for military-led humanitarian interventions, arguing that the blending of humanitarianism with human rights concerns causes aid agencies to abandon their neutrality. Key examples included Kosovo and Afghanistan, where many agencies first advocated for military intervention, and then worked alongside the military to provide post-intervention relief. The Iraq war later brought this dialog to a 'fever pitch,' as both practitioners and academics argued that NGOs were being co-opted to an unprecedented level in the US-led 'War on Terror,' and that this could become a seminal turning point for humanitarianism (Feinstein Center 2004). This far-reaching introspection was ongoing in the months immediately preceding the tsunami.

To a certain extent, the massive scope of the tsunami response appears to have temporarily distracted the aid community from this introspection. The tsunami was first and foremost a natural disaster, and held significantly less of the global-level politicization of aid that was prominent in the man-made emergencies of Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result the relationship of NGOs to the policy agenda of Northern donors remains ambiguous, and the related ethical dilemmas will almost certainly re-appear in future humanitarian responses. The

relevance of conflict sensitivity will be limited if it fails to grapple with the structural and ethical dilemmas of the international system.

With regard to the operational practicality of the new humanitarianism, the report *Ambiguity and Change* points out that the humanitarian world view has shifted from single-issue to multiple-issue, such that "NGOs will either have to become 'super-NGOs' covering a waterfront of issues, or create more refined and better operationalised avenues for networking and collaboration with other NGOs and actors" (Feinstein Center 2004:72). A fundamental question remains whether comprehensive programmes are always more effective than narrow ones (Feinstein Center 2004:78).

A number of NGOs present at a 2004 DNH Project consultation⁵ described a loss of momentum in applying DNH to emergency response programmes, despite having begun to apply DNH to their community development efforts. This parallels the observation of Barbolet et al. (2005:6) that conflict sensitivity, while often discussed, has rarely been mainstreamed, due in part to agency fatigue with new initiatives: "The development sector is suffering from initiative overload, having had the mainstreaming of environment, gender and rights-based approaches on the agenda over the past few years. Many people let out a collective groan at the idea of yet another 'mainstreaming' initiative."

To a significant extent, these interagency developments have their parallels in the experience of World Vision. Conflict sensitivity has been seen to add significant value, yet consistent application and organizational mainstreaming remain challenging, particularly in emergency response programming. WV's experiences are illustrated in the sections that follow, with emphasis on the Asian pre-tsunami and tsunami response case studies.

⁵Interagency DNH Consultation, 28 November - 1 December 2004, facilitated by the Collaborative for Development Action, Cambridge, USA.

IV. WORLD VISION EXPERIENCE PRE-TSUNAMI


World Vision is a Christian relief, development and advocacy organization dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. The organization works in nearly one hundred countries through a federated partnership structure. Conflict sensitivity applies to all three of the major programmatic streams, i.e. relief, development and advocacy. This section describes World Vision's conflict sensitivity work in relief contexts prior to the tsunami, with emphasis on Asian emergency response case studies from North Maluku (Indonesia), the Philippines and Cambodia.

■ GLOBAL STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES⁶

WV Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs⁷ responds to three types of emergencies: slow on-set natural disasters, rapid on-set

natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies (which typically include political breakdown and/or violent conflict). Organizationally, WV classifies its responses into three categories, determined by the level of the humanitarian need and the scope of the proposed programme. A Category I emergency response is managed by the National Office. Category II is usually managed regionally, and Category III is managed at the global level, both in collaboration with the affected National Offices. In recent years, a Global Rapid Response Team, Regional Relief Teams and pre-positioned relief supply depots have strengthened WV's responsive capacity. These dedicated resources are supplemented by additional short-term staff deployments through the Global Emergency Response Network.

FIGURE 1: ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE PROGRAMME DESIGN



⁶ This section is adapted from Bill Lowrey's Introduction in Garred (ed.) 2006.

⁷ Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs' was formerly called 'Emergency Response and Disaster Mitigation.'

In 1997, World Vision was awarded a two-year grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts to explore promising ways to support peacebuilding among refugees and displaced persons in complex humanitarian emergencies. This project established an initial linkage between WV and the inter-agency 'Do No Harm Project.' World Vision Sudan⁸ then joined the DNH Project in its implementation phase, with the goal of field-testing the newly developed DNH framework. Participating staff felt that this added significant value to the programme: "Most importantly, LCP (DNH) has provided us with the opportunity to improve the quality of our work in Sudan" (Riak 2000).

Though WV was initially drawn into DNH through emergency response operations, many staff also believed that it could also improve programming in the community development context. WV was also aware that DNH is not the best tool for every task, though it is well suited for relatively simple analysis at the local level. Thus began a period of tool development and testing that continues to this day. The following diagram demonstrates the three primary analysis tools now used for conflict-sensitive programming in World Vision.

The foundational tool is DNH, which introduces the core concepts of conflict sensitivity into programme design. WV has found that DNH works best at the micro level, for example as applied to a single project in a specific location. In order to make maximum use of the tool there has been a strong emphasis on developing trainers who can conduct training workshops for a critical mass of staff. WV now has more than one hundred trainers across its international partnership, half of whom are in the Asia-Pacific Region, and thousands of staff worldwide have completed introductory workshops. Though DNH is sometimes criticised for its simplicity, this same quality greatly facilitates uptake at the community level.

At the meso (district or programme) level, the 'Integrating Peacebuilding and Development' (iPAD) tool blends DNH with key aspects of the WV Transformational Development

Framework to enhance resilience to violent conflict. This tool emphasizes intentional programmatic application of 'Five Strategic Processes for Integration of Peacebuilding':

1. Creating a culture of good governance;
2. Transforming persons;
3. Working in coalitions that impact beyond commonly recognized boundaries;
4. Enhancing community capacities that generate hope; and
5. Developing sustainable livelihoods with just distribution of resources

iPAD uses participatory assessment methodologies such as participatory learning and action, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. iPAD requires a solid foundation of DNH skills, and there are currently twenty to thirty iPAD facilitators in the WV International Partnership.

At the macro (national or regional) level, WV uses 'Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts' or 'MSTC'⁹ (in press). This is a WV tool, first conceptualized by World Vision International's former Vice-President for Ministry. Reflecting on the Le Billon paper (2000), the Vice-President noted that WV did not have the capacity to analyse the economic drivers of war, and that developing this capacity could benefit WV as well as other humanitarian and advocacy agencies. WV's emergency response and advocacy networks collaborated to develop the tool. MSTC helps humanitarian actors to systematically analyse the dynamics of chronic political instability in their areas of operation, including the influence of natural disasters. It analyses the dynamics of both 'greed' and 'grievance,' and the resulting insights inform strategic and operational planning. This is a new and relatively complex tool, with fewer than ten MSTC facilitators in the WV International Partnership, plus an emerging cadre of informal trainees.

⁸ With funding support from WV Canada.

⁹ "Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts" was formerly called "Situations of Chronic Political Instability."

Regarding staff capacity, the concept of conflict sensitivity is quickly grasped, and awareness is steadily increasing. However understanding conflict sensitivity as a concept is distinct from becoming a skilled user of analytical tools. Thus there are still relatively few staff that have become active practitioners of DNH analysis within their own programmes. There are even fewer who have the advanced analytical and facilitation skills required to take on resource person functions, such as leading a participatory DNH assessment, advising on DME integration or contributing to MSTC. WV's supply of conflict sensitivity skills is growing rapidly, but the demand is growing even faster.

Conflict sensitivity finds a conceptual home within LEAP (Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning), WV's common framework for programme design, monitoring and evaluation, released in 2005. In this framework, context analysis has been given a prominent place, and DNH is recognized as a foundational tool at the micro level. Peacebuilding is defined as one of six primary crosscutting themes to be integrated in programme design. The other five themes are: gender, disability, protection, environment and Christian commitment. Learning is ongoing about how to operationalise LEAP and the integration of cross-cutting themes within LEAP.

For WV as a Christian NGO, one aspect of conflict sensitivity is appropriate contextualization of the Christian commitment theme in sensitive multi-faith contexts. Our mission is to follow Jesus Christ in working among the poor, serving all people regardless of religion, race, ethnicity or gender. WV does not proselytize, and is prepared to collaborate with all people who seek the well being of the community. Senior peacebuilding and Christian commitment staff work together regularly to integrate this ethos, and many National Offices have a growing involvement in inter-faith peacebuilding.

Between 2000 and 2004 much of WV's conflict sensitivity work took place in Area Development Programmes (ADPs)¹⁰.

This was originally conceptualized as a relief-oriented form of disaster mitigation and resilience, but the uptake and staff capacity building was strongest among community development staff and networks. In the Asia-Pacific Region, Centers of Learning were established in ADPs in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia¹¹ and Mindanao, Philippines¹². The Centers of Learning tested the application of DNH to the ADP context, including the impact on programme design, staff, and community leaders, and documented the learnings. Learning such as those documented in *A Shared Future: Local Capacities for Peace in Community Development* (Garred ed. 2006) have had a transferable influence to other WV National Offices.

During the 2000-2004 period, applications of conflict sensitivity were rare in WV emergency programmes, particularly in the early phases of the responses. The case studies that follow, from North Maluku (Indonesia) the Philippines and Cambodia, are among the noteworthy exceptions. They demonstrate solid conflict sensitivity effort, and provide both achievements and challenges as a basis for learning.

■ CASE STUDY: NORTH MALUKU, INDONESIA EMERGENCY RESPONSE 2000 - 2004¹³

This case illustrates a strategic positioning application of DNH that shaped the nature of the emergency response and laid the groundwork for active peacebuilding as a goal during the rehabilitation phase.

North Maluku Province in northeastern Indonesia is comprised of several islands. In 1999, the Indonesian government declared North Maluku to be separate from Maluku Province, and this sparked a highly complex set of latent tensions between migrants and locals, different ethnic groups and Muslim and Christian religious groups. The nine months of violence claimed 3,000 lives, displaced 200,000, and left the province divided into homogenous Christian and Muslim enclaves. WV's ADP on Halmahera Island was forced to close. At the same time, WV launched an emergency response focused on food and health assistance to IDPs. This was a

¹⁰ The Area Development Programme is WV's programmatic model for community development. The ADP takes place in a defined geographic area that includes numerous villages or towns, and emphasizes sustainable, community-based, sectorally-integrated activities focused especially on the needs of children.

¹¹ With funding support from WV Canada.

¹² With funding support from WV United States.

¹³ This case study is adapted from Harder and Subandi (2004) and Harder (2005).

Category II response, but managed by the National rather than the Regional Office. By late 2001, the programme shifted into rehabilitation, which focused on reconstruction, health education and peacebuilding.

Achievements. In 2000, WV Indonesia's DNH training and assessment skills were in early stages, supported by a new Peacebuilding Unit. The interest of the National Director, North Maluku Programme Manager and key North Maluku programme staff was quite strong. From the earliest stage they championed a vision of breaking down the walls between the two groups, Christians and Muslims. There was also a keen awareness of the challenges that WV, as a Christian organization, would face in rebuilding trust with Muslim IDPs.

Early-phase DNH analyses led to key leadership decisions regarding strategic positioning. Follow-up assessments informed design, monitoring and evaluation throughout the programme cycle.

1. In the initial response, WV decided to enter North Maluku through Ternate, the provincial capital where Muslim IDPs had clustered, rather than Tobelo where Christian IDPs had gathered near the site of WV's previous ADP. This made a strong statement of impartiality, which helped build trust among Muslim beneficiaries and authorities.

2. WV decided to hire both Muslim and Christian staff. During the early relief they were segregated geographically, but WV was open about its intentions to bring the two groups together. With time, the Christian and Muslim staff members were able to work and even live together. "In the field, the staff traveled in pairs - one Christian and one Muslim staff on the same motorcycle" (Indo-Pacific 2004:38).

3. WV decided to structure its two operating zones in a way that ensured a heterogeneous beneficiary mix, creating more opportunities to demonstrate that Christians and Muslims can work together for a common goal.



4. WV obtained permission of Dutch and US government donors to amend its roofing kit programme, in order to meet the same housing needs while strengthening support for reconciliation between Christian and Muslim communities.

When the rehabilitation phase began in 2001, the programme was refocused with explicit peacebuilding as a primary goal. Major peacebuilding projects included the following:

1. Peacebuilding through Children's Education¹⁴, which included activity centers staffed by trained trauma support workers, and special community events.
2. 'Harmonis' Peace and Tolerance Magazine¹⁵ for children.
3. Teacher Training¹⁶, which equipped educators to integrate peace education.

This is an excellent example of the distinctions and linkages between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. In the emergency phase, DNH informed the design of traditional programme sectors, such as shelter reconstruction. It also laid a foundation for peacebuilding by establishing impartial positioning and mixed Christian-Muslim staff teams. In the rehabilitation phase, peacebuilding itself began operating as a sector in and of itself, fostering a number of active peacebuilding projects. This decision was based not only on the situation in North Maluku, but also on the observation that internal conflict was on the rise in other regions of Indonesia.

Challenges. Efforts to build mixed Muslim-Christian staff teams required special attention to the needs of individuals. "Because almost all local staff members lost someone in their family from the conflict, they were personally deeply affected by the events. World Vision established programmes for the staff such as trauma healing to help them become examples for others" (Indo-Pacific 2004:41). Additionally, another challenge was presented by the timing of funding cycles. WV Indonesia believed that areas affected by conflict would need five to ten

years to recover, including time for transitioning and relationship building, allowing communities to become comfortable living with their neighbors. Nonetheless, post-conflict peacebuilding grants were available for only a few years, with most activities phasing out in 2004.

■ CASE STUDY: MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES, SUPPORT TO CONFLICT EVACUEES 2003

This case illustrates DNH integration in the first phase of emergency response, based on the fact the relief operations staff were experienced DNH practitioners with a deep knowledge of the local context.

The island of Mindanao suffers from periodic intense fighting between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philippines. In 2003 a sharp escalation caused the displacement of about 200,000 individuals in Central Mindanao. WV had no ADPs in the immediate vicinity, so it responded by working through local government and NGO partners. The Category I response focused on provision



¹⁴ Funded by DFID.

¹⁵ Funded by the European Union.

¹⁶ Funded by UNDP, UNICEF and DFID.

of food and non-food items to individuals taking shelter in Evacuation Centers and with relatives, for six weeks between February and April 2003. The beneficiaries included all local ethnic groups, Muslims, Visayan Christian migrants and indigenous Lumads, but the majority of beneficiaries were Muslims.

Achievements. In this case, no formal DNH assessment was conducted. Though WV had been monitoring the situation, the spike in hostilities occurred faster than expected, and only three of WV's key operations staff were involved in the response. These staff were DNH practitioners and trainers affiliated with the nearby Center of Learning. They were able to apply their existing DNH skills, plus their deep knowledge of the local context, in order to conduct continuous 'real-time' DNH analysis of their programme plans.

The WV staff were aware that the dividing factors in Central Mindanao include unequal access to resources, and a pervasive lack of understanding between Christians and Muslims. As a Christian agency working in this delicate context, they placed their priority on demonstrating respect for the culture and values of Muslim beneficiaries. Following a rapid assessment by partner agencies, WV staff took special care in planning the distribution as follows:

1. No food items containing pork or pork flavoring were included in the distribution. Though a favorite food of Christian migrants in Mindanao, pork products would have been 'haram' (forbidden) for Muslims.
2. The distribution schedule was set in times that did not interfere with the Muslim prayer times, and there were separate lines for men and women in accordance with local Muslim practices.
3. The children's toys did not include any pigs or dogs, as these were offensive to the Muslim community members. Further, the toys did not include any guns or weapons.

4. Children's toys distributed to each evacuation center were the same size, since the children and their parents would equate size with value. The team painstakingly segregated, loaded and monitored the toy distribution.

5. These are simple but meaningful achievements, often overlooked by both Christian and secular agencies working in Mindanao communities, where Muslims as well as Lumads have long been structurally marginalized.

Forced seizure of relief goods happened to a number of agencies during the early days of the response. After receiving reliable information from the community that a WV relief convoy would be targeted, the relief team sought advice from respected local elders and leaders. The elders and leaders agreed to join in the convoy and the distribution of goods. As a result, the convoy and distribution passed securely, without resorting to the local practice of using armed guards.

Challenges. This was a minimalist application of DNH, and the absence of formal assessment contributed to some issues being overlooked. Beneficiary lists from partners had not been verified, so there was some diversion of goods to families who were not evacuees. Some evacuees realized this and reacted violently. The relief team defused the situation, and re-validated the beneficiary lists. Additionally, the presence of Muslim religious leaders in the evacuation centers was not discovered until mid-way through the project. If involved earlier, these religious leaders might have mitigated disputes and helped to ensure the security of aid workers. This would also have helped to communicate respect for local Muslim values.

Despite the application of conflict sensitivity in this response, WV does not yet have the institutional capacity to replicate this effort in other parts of the Philippines. This is due to several interrelated factors:

1. In one of the team assessments conducted, staff felt that the overall emergency response system was more reactive than

pro-active. There is a need to formulate a systematic process in emergency response, which will support progress in conflict sensitivity and other key areas of programme quality. WV is currently considering this need as part of their strategic planning process.

2. WV staff across the country are not well-equipped with DNH skills. The capacity of the South Central Mindanao team is high because this zone hosts the Center of Learning. There have been temporary injections of conflict sensitivity into other emergency responses, simply because South Central Mindanao staff were deployed there. The national cadre of new DNH trainers is inactive due to lack of mentoring. WV is now considering this issue as part of its strategic planning process.

3. WV is also working to change the perception that conflict happens only in Mindanao. WV first took up DNH in Mindanao, but there is now an increasing awareness of lower-intensity latent conflict across many parts of the country. WV's current operational plan calls for the expansion of DNH from Mindanao to the Luzon and Visayas Regions.

■ CASE STUDY: CAMBODIA DROUGHT RESPONSE 2004

This case illustrates DNH integration in the first phase of emergency response, based on collaboration between relief operations staff and conflict sensitivity advisors during the preparedness phase. Cambodia experienced a massive drought in 2004, which affected many parts of the country and caused significant rice crop failure. Eighty-five percent of the Cambodian population are rice farmers, and most reported not having enough rice stock to survive the year. To feed their families, many villages had begun migrating away from home for labor income, or borrowing food and money at high interest. With the objective of helping the most vulnerable people survive, the World Food Programme worked with WV to provide a Category I relief response in the affected ADPs. Over 6,000 households received 314 metric tons of rice support.



Achievements. Conflict analysis was conducted during the preparedness phase, as part of WV's ongoing community development programming. The National Office 'Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan' specified that in case of drought, the ERDM and Peacebuilding Teams would work together to integrate DNH in the response. The Peacebuilding Team partnered with ADPs and grant-funded projects to conduct eight participatory conflict assessments. These used DNH and iPad tools, contextualized to the context of Cambodia through the development of assessment questions and PLA approaches that were particularly attuned to understanding structural violence and latent conflict. Key conflict and violence issues were identified, as well as common patterns of interaction with WV programming. A number of relief staff participated in DNH events.

When the National Director declared the early warning phase in July 2004, the staff began contingency planning. The Peacebuilding Team provided programming recommendations based on previous conflict assessments, and met with relief and ADP managers to discuss the issues. These managers identified conflict between political parties, within a context of significant power abuse through diversion and favoritism by village leaders, as the critical issue. They noted that previous aid distribution decisions had been strongly influenced by village leaders who had mixed motives, and who did not include the minority political parties. If upcoming distributions followed this pattern, they would likely reinforce the abuse of power.

This analysis informed the programme design, monitoring and evaluation in two significant ways, these being community-based beneficiary selection and rapid social impact evaluation.

1. Community-Based Beneficiary Selection: WV staff met with commune level¹⁷ authorities to discuss the potentially negative impact of delegating beneficiary selection to village authorities. As an alternative, the commune authorities established Village Relief Distribution Committees with representatives from the

three major political parties, elders, village authorities, Village Development Committee members, as well as rich, medium and poor families. These committees crossed the potential fault lines in the patterns of power abuse. Each committee developed beneficiary criteria and revised the old ADP wealth ranking lists. The committee conducted an open village meeting to discuss the process and criteria and agree on the beneficiary list.

2. Rapid Social Impact Evaluation: The peacebuilding and relief teams developed a Rapid Social Impact Evaluation tool (see Annex B), which they implemented within one month of the initial response. The focus was on assessing community understanding and feeling about the distribution, and whether any mistakes or conflicts arose during implementation. The findings from three ADPs showed that the villages that used the community-based beneficiary selection process had minimal jealousy problems, and were able to quickly and peacefully resolve complaints. The minority political parties expressed gratitude for being included in such a process for the first time. The villages that did not use the community-based selection process experienced significant jealousy, disagreement and conflict. There were allegations of partisanship, with some threats and forced redistribution of rice.

Challenges.

1. Even in this slow onset disaster, there was not enough time to conduct a participatory conflict assessment during the first phase of relief. The situation of the communities was desperate, and the staff were under time constraints. Thus WV made programming decisions based on previous conflict assessment findings, combined with the local knowledge of staff and community leaders. While this limited the analysis, they were still able to accurately identify the highest-priority concerns. This was workable because the previous assessments had been conducted recently in villages whose social contexts were quite similar to those affected by drought.

2. The recommendations on community-based beneficiary selection were optional. Due to the time pressure, many ADPs

¹⁷ In Cambodia, each commune includes multiple villages.

chose not to incorporate the recommendations into their responses, contributing to the negative social impact described above. However, the WV Cambodia ERDM Programme now formally recommends that these steps be used in future responses. These steps might also be incorporated into the Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan.

3. Even in the ADPs that adopted the conflict sensitivity recommendations, the abuse of power was not totally eliminated. For example, when WV staff involved the local authorities in making speeches during the distribution, some used the speech as an opportunity for political promotion.

4. Inter-departmental collaboration requires ongoing attention. Some ADP staff felt that the Peacebuilding Team was 'auditing' or manipulating to follow their own agenda. This occurred mainly in ADPs that initially did not take up the recommendations and abated once ongoing collaboration was established.

5. In spite of the existence of a small Peacebuilding Team, there are not sufficient resource persons to meet the needs of all ADPs and relief projects in WV Cambodia. Thus the WV National Office plans a DNH Training of Trainers and mentoring in 2006, so that operations staff can serve as resource persons in their own zones. DNH assessment is also being integrated into the LEAP cycle.

■ ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS PRIOR TO TSUNAMI

This section briefly summarizes the learnings from the three pre-tsunami cases by identifying some key conflict sensitivity achievements and challenges that were common across cases.

Achievements. These case studies illustrate that contrary to common staff perceptions, conflict sensitivity is possible in the early phases of emergency response if the organization is prepared. All three National Offices had previously trained key rapid responders and/or senior managers in DNH, and they were able to utilize these skills when the emergency

occurred. Additionally, WV Cambodia had a pre-existing body of quality conflict assessment data, which formed the basis for conflict sensitivity in the drought response.

Taken together, the cases also illustrate conflict sensitivity influence flowing from three distinct parts of the organization.

- In North Maluku, early DNH decisions were driven by senior management, including the Programme Manager and National Director. This model is very effective in addressing strategic positioning, but additional staff capacity is needed to address follow-up issues of programme design and implementation.
- In the Philippines, DNH decisions were taken by the local operations staff, who were also experienced DNH practitioners. This model is the most flexible, but is inconsistent because it depends on the interests and skills of individuals.
- In Cambodia, DNH recommendations were provided by full-time conflict sensitivity advisors. This model is replicable, because it is rooted in the institutional system, but also requires a significant staffing investment.

These three approaches can be combined, and each of the National Offices in question has moved in this direction. This diversity of experience reflects the assertion of International Alert et al. that "all practitioners at all levels . . . can impact . . . the development of their institution's capacity for conflict sensitivity" (2004:5,1).

Finally, these cases show a progression of methodology over time, which reflects ongoing learning as influenced by the ADP-based Centers of Learning. WV Cambodia as the most recent case is particularly advanced.

1. In the preparedness phase,
 - Emergency response and conflict sensitivity staff can

establish agreements regarding the use of conflict sensitivity in emergency response. At the National Office level, this can include use of the Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan.

- Conflict sensitivity staff can build trusting partnerships with emergency response staff, including provision of training and joint participation in routine conflict assessments.
- Conflict sensitivity staff can conduct regular assessments, making available a pool of high-quality data even prior to the onset of emergency.

2. If the slow onset of disaster provides time for an early warning and contingency planning phase, this can involve input from conflict sensitivity experts such that design decisions are in place before implementation begins.

3. Relief processes can use a Rapid Social Impact Evaluation (see Annex B) as a time-sensitive minimum effort to assess any social problems that are associated with the relief intervention.

Challenges. Among the challenges found in these three cases, it can be seen that even in small-scale, slow-onset disasters, staff time is a significant constraint. Efficient conflict sensitivity strategies are those that maximize key positioning decisions, while minimizing the demand on staff time, during the early phases of response. There is also evidence of a persistent shortage of conflict sensitivity practitioners and resource people, with each National Office considering how to best position its conflict sensitivity capacity for maximum reach. Finally, there is an ongoing need for staff awareness raising on sensitive issues, such as improving inter-faith relations and recognizing embedded structures of power abuse.

By the end of 2004, there had been no formal identification or comparison of these emergency response learnings, because WV's conflict sensitivity capacity was resident primarily

among community development staff. Nonetheless the increasing levels of interest made it possible to mobilize an unprecedented level of conflict sensitivity support to the Asia Tsunami Response.

V. Conflict Sensitivity in WV Asia Tsunami Response



The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 claimed an estimated 227,000 lives, and left over 1.7 million displaced around the region (Telford and Cosgrave 2006:15). The scope of the tragedy, and the international community's response, were in many ways unprecedented. For WV, this Category III response, including Aceh (Indonesia), Sri Lanka, India and Thailand and estimated at three years duration, was the largest ever undertaken.

The first phase of the response was led by the Global Rapid Response Team, with contributing staff deployed from National Offices and the WV Global Emergency Response Network. In mid-February, Phase II strategic planning began, and the shift to Phase III took place around the one-year mark. Country programmes exercise significant autonomy, within the parameters of dual accountability to the Asia Tsunami Response Office in Singapore and to the respective

National Offices. Coordination between Tsunami Response programmes and National Offices has been intensive, with authority shifting to the National Offices as the programme progresses.

■ MULTI-COUNTRY STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES

Early in the response, the WV International Partnership demonstrated a growing awareness of the need for conflict sensitivity, particularly in Sri Lanka and Aceh Province, Indonesia. A number of internal stakeholders raised the issue, and WV Canada circulated compilations of macro-level conflict sensitivity issues highlighted in the media. At the request of the World Vision Asia Tsunami Response Team (ATRTR), a multi-country series of conflict assessments was conducted between February and May 2005. At around the same time, parallel assessments were commissioned on other priority sectors and themes, such as child protection and HIV/AIDS, with the intention of feeding into Phase II plans. The tsunami response was considered well-funded in its early phases, a key factor which made such comprehensive assessment possible.

WV Asia-Pacific Pax Net network mobilized conflict assessment teams composed of skilled National Office staff plus technical experts deployed from other WV offices. There were not enough resource persons to staff all teams simultaneously, or to conduct MSTC in every country, so countries were prioritized according to perceived risk. Thus Sri Lanka and Aceh (Indonesia), both affected by recent civil wars, were considered higher risk for exacerbating violent conflict and assessed using both MSTC macro-analysis and DNH micro-assessment. India and Thailand, with latent communal tensions relating to issues such as migration and caste, were assessed using only DNH. Sri Lanka, Aceh (Indonesia) and India were assessed in February and March, but Thailand was not assessed until May¹⁸. WV's existing conflict sensitivity capacity lay in community development programming, so methodology had to be adjusted both before and during the assessment itself, with careful attention to lessons learned.

In addition to country-specific assessment findings, one prominent multi-country issue was highlighted. This was the massive investment in shelter and infrastructure re-construction, which is sorely needed and has contributed significantly to recovery and well-being. However, in many of the operating contexts, shelter and infrastructure re-construction were systemically linked to the dynamics of politics, violence and/or exclusion. Complicating factors include pressure for rapid implementation, and the strong decision-making role of governments in beneficiary and site selection.

These early assessments also informed ATRTR's overall conflict sensitivity strategy. Staffing proposals included full-time in-country advisors supported by a Singapore-based manager. At varying times, there were one full-time advisor in-country in India, one in Aceh, and two in Sri Lanka. (See Annex A for a sample job description pertaining to this role). The Singapore-based manager provided fourteen months of technical support and capacity building to the national programmes, with early emphasis on filling the assessment gaps caused by delayed in-country hires, and later emphasis on building the capacity of in-country advisors once identified. Two highly conflict sensitivity skilled staff from the Philippines and Indonesia National Offices were seconded to assist during the peak capacity building period, thereby strengthening their own skills as master trainers.

The staff capacity building plans were three-fold:

1. DNH Orientation (e.g. one-day workshop) first for managers, then for other staff. The one-day module provides awareness of DNH purpose and core concepts. This approach was designed to accelerate DNH uptake by raising awareness among large numbers of staff who need to understand and support WV's commitment to DNH, but do not themselves need to become proficient at using DNH as an analytical tool.
2. DNH Practitioner Skills Training for selected programme designers and implementers (e.g. three- to five-day training

¹⁸ Conflict sensitivity work was limited in the first year of the Thailand Tsunami Response programme, and therefore it is not covered in this paper. In the second year, the Thailand Tsunami Response Team and WV Foundation of Thailand are taking up DNH, including staff training, selected assessments and programme design integration.

with programmatic application). This module equips practitioners to apply DNH as an analysis tool within the scope of their own role. Wherever possible, field practicum exercises were included to increase the likelihood of course participants becoming active DNH practitioners.

3. Training of Resource Persons¹⁹ through DNH Training of Trainers (eleven days, December 2005) and Training of Assessment Facilitators (10 days, February 2006). These modules equipped sixteen advanced participants to serve as a resource to others, throughout their own and potentially other country programmes. Thirteen of the sixteen have thus far become active in leading training and/or assessment.

MSTC facilitator trainees are also being mentored in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but this is a slow process because there are currently less than 5 MSTC practice opportunities per year in the WV Partnership.

During the first year, ATRT's conflict sensitivity efforts were focused on pursuing a minimal standard of consistency in 'doing no harm.' MSTC and DNH, as relief-oriented tools, were used extensively. The resulting conflict assessment recommendations were intended to inform planning at both the level of strategic positioning (early-stage, high-level decisions such as programme scope, operating zones, sectors, partners, and approach to sensitive contextual issues) and the level of programme design, monitoring and evaluation. Staff awareness raising and practitioner training more commonly influences issues of programme implementation, which can have a very significant impact on conflict sensitivity, even if they are considered too 'small' to appear in the programme design documents.

Active peacebuilding was not pursued during the first year of tsunami response. WV's iPAD methodology, with its five strategic processes for integration of peacebuilding, is primarily oriented toward community development, making it less

directly applicable during the early phases of an emergency. Further the newly-appointed conflict sensitivity resource persons required time to build DNH skills before taking on the additional demands of iPAD. Thus iPAD will be selectively introduced in the second and third years to support meso-level transitional programming, particularly in Sri Lanka. DNH capacity building for community leaders, as well as linkages to active peacebuilding projects, are proposed for year three. Conflict sensitivity is also a proposed component of future end-of-programme evaluations.

■ CASE STUDY: SRI LANKA TSUNAMI RESPONSE

In Sri Lanka, a separatist struggle between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the predominantly Sinhalese government has claimed over 65,000 lives since 1983. A 2002 cease-fire agreement is deteriorating while additional, linked tensions grow between Muslim and Tamil populations in the East. In the first year of the tsunami response programme, WV is serving nine districts with interventions including shelter, infrastructure, water and sanitation, health and nutrition, economic recovery, child protection, and disaster mitigation. This is part of the broader long-term development effort of the WV Lanka National Office.

Achievements. The entry point for conflict analysis in the Lanka Tsunami Response was two-fold:

- Macro-level analysis (March 2005) using MSTC tools identifying key contextual issues and scenarios that should be considered in strategy development and programme design.
- Micro-level DNH assessment (March 2005) focused on Ampara District.

Both activities were jointly commissioned by the tsunami response programme and the WV Lanka National Office, but were led by ATRT and National Office staff.

¹⁹ An experienced resource person working in a full-time capacity is often referred to as an 'advisor.'



WV has identified permanent shelter as the priority for conflict sensitivity work. Shelter is a priority issue across the multi-country response, but even more delicate in Sri Lanka due to the potentially enormous consequences of resettling families in a post-war context. With this in mind, the Tsunami Response Team partnered with the National Office for further analysis as summarized below:

- Household assessment (October 2005 - ongoing) incorporating conflict sensitivity questions into a household survey of all permanent shelter beneficiaries in eight of nine implementing districts. One result of

this assessment was to identify non-tsunami-affected families on the beneficiary lists, thus avoiding a serious impetus for future conflict within resettlement communities.

- Micro-level DNH assessment²⁰ (March/April 2006) in six districts primarily targeting permanent shelter resettlement sites, in partnership with a leading local conflict resolution organization. One additional district will be assessed in May 2006.
- Baseline survey analysis (May 2006) will incorporate the results of a recent baseline survey, permanent shelter DNH

²⁰Assessment teams were led and trained by two consultants with extensive WV experience.

assessments and household survey findings into a consolidated report to support 2007 programme planning.

By the end of approximately the first year, analysis results had been integrated in shelter reconstruction planning and implementation as follows:

1. Development of housing strategy paper. The 'Permanent Housing Strategy Paper' highlighted the importance of contextual analysis and consultation in housing, establishing 'do no harm' as a guiding principle of the programme.
2. Dedicated district-based staff for community and inter-agency engagement. The District Stakeholder Representative position is unique to this response, and has been developed to oversee community consultation and field-based advocacy in the shelter programme. Additionally, District Liaison Officers support inter-agency coordination and advocacy, providing additional field-based capacity for DNH implementation. DNH training was prioritized for these groups in July 2005 (practitioner training) and April 2006 (assessment training), so that conflict sensitivity could be integrated into district-level programming.
3. Beneficiary selection. Practical application of training has impacted beneficiary selection, with examples as follows:
 - a. Stakeholder Representatives verify all government-provided shelter beneficiary lists to ensure aid is targeted to the tsunami-affected, while also identifying potential conflict among those families who will be resettling to a new location, especially related to ethnicity or caste.
 - b. Where appropriate and possible, targeting is ethnically balanced. For example, in Ampara District, great efforts were made to provide shelter to Tamils and Muslims in relatively equal numbers according to similar construction timelines.
 - c. Site selection in Hambantota District defused serious

tensions based on the perception of preferential selection of Sinhalese families for housing programmes. World Vision has positioned its programme interventions in a location where both Muslim and Sinhalese beneficiaries reside, notably a large-scale water treatment plant which will resolve long-standing water shortages affecting all communities in the area.

4. Integrating DNH into Year Two shelter design and reporting. Conflict analysis and follow-up was integrated into the second year shelter log frame and district monthly reports. Additionally, progress on DNH issues was incorporated into bi-weekly management reporting for Stakeholder Representatives and District Liaison Officers.
 5. Recruitment of increasingly religiously diverse staff. By hiring Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim staff, the tsunami response programme is more reflective of communities and better accepted by those communities. This also helps in communicating that WV as a Christian agency does not proselytize, which is a sensitive issue in the Sri Lankan context.
 6. Minimizing negative distribution effects. Other projects have also sought to decrease aid-related tensions, particularly across ethnic lines, and between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected communities. Cash-for-work roads, tube wells and health clinics have been carefully positioned to benefit both tsunami and conflict-affected communities in Ampara, Batticaloa and Jaffna.
- Conflict sensitivity efforts picked up pace with the recruitment of a DNH Advisor and Officer in February 2006. This allowed the Tsunami Response Team and the National Office to develop a strategy for cooperation, especially crucial in tsunami-affected areas targeted for ADP development. 'Action plans' were developed for each district based on the May 2006 DNH assessment, supported by a one-day DNH orientation session for managers in each zone. DNH capacity building for community leaders has been planned for 2007.

Challenges.

1. Pressure for quick results. Unprecedented donor resources allowed for significant opportunities to assist tsunami victims, but also posed challenges for programme planning. The pressure for quick results, particularly in shelter and infrastructure, meant that staff, processes and analysis were not put in place before MOUs were signed and construction began. Also, the implementing staff were reluctant to take on what was perceived as another initiative likely to slow down construction. Therefore a full DNH analysis was rarely done prior to project initiation. Rather, the DNH analysis focused on identifying solutions during or after project implementation.

2. Equity. One of the key inter-agency issues in tsunami programming is equity between the tsunami-affected and

conflict-affected, particularly in the highly visible shelter reconstruction. New houses for tsunami victims are regularly being constructed near to conflict-displaced communities who have been living in camps for over ten years. Under current donor policies, tsunami funds cannot be readily used for conflict-affected families. However, where possible, World Vision has attempted to design interventions that benefit both communities. It is hoped that additional funding for the conflict-affected can be raised through the WV Lanka ERDM Team.

3. Staffing and recruitment challenges. Because of the large-scale nature of the response, recruitment of qualified staff was a significant challenge for every aspect of implementation, including hiring of DNH staff. Competing priorities meant that it was often a protracted process as international recruiters



struggled to meet programme needs. Advertisements were placed in papers, but qualified national candidates were not identified. The time required to research alternative avenues of recruitment was not available due to the pace of implementation and the level of understaffing. Finally, internal candidates were hired in February 2006.

4. Changing 'Buffer Zone' policy. The government's 'buffer zone' policy was enacted immediately following the tsunami, restricting any reconstruction within one hundred meters of the sea in the South, and two hundred meters in the East and North. The variations created suspicions that Tamil and Muslim dominated areas in the North/East were being restricted more than the Sinhalese-dominated South. The buffer zone was changed in October 2005 and again in December 2005. Thus resettlement decisions were altered multiple times, leaving families feeling vulnerable and increasingly angry at the lack of progress. Each change also required WV's Stakeholder Representatives to repeat the beneficiary intake process, and re-consider the potential conflict issues in each resettlement site.

■ CASE STUDY: ACEH, INDONESIA TSUNAMI RESPONSE

Aceh Province, Indonesia, was the area hardest hit by the tsunami. This tragedy compounded the affects of thirty previous years of separatist conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. The current peace process following an August 2005 Memorandum of Understanding has been successful beyond most expectations. WV Indonesia has a long-term presence across the country, but was not operational in Aceh prior to the tsunami. In year one, WV worked across five Aceh zones in sectors including shelter, health, livelihood, education, water and sanitation, and child protection.

Achievements. The initial conflict analysis of March 2005, as jointly commissioned by the tsunami response programme and the WV Indonesia National Office, was done in two phases:

- Macro-level analysis, using MSTC tools, and focusing on the context of Aceh Province in relation to the rest of Indonesia. The analysis was done in a Jakarta work shop setting (due to emergency-phase logistical constraints in Aceh), and included WV and partner agency representatives from Aceh as well as other parts of Indonesia.
- Micro-level DNH assessments, conducted in Aceh using community-based participatory methods, and focusing per National Office request on staffing and inter-faith issues. Consultations were conducted with local religious and CBO leaders.

During the first year, conflict assessment recommendations influenced programme design and implementation decisions as follows:

1. The year one ²¹ shelter strategy was designed to be primarily community-based, which aligned with MSTC recommendations. Among many other factors, this was an effort to avoid the unintended impacts of certain types of large-scale contracting, which during the time of armed conflict had potential to significantly exacerbate local tensions.
2. Using contacts established during the DNH assessment, WV partnered with Acehese artists to facilitate creative arts via WV's Child Friendly Spaces, and to sponsor joint exhibitions. This initiative builds on the visual arts as a force for both unity and psycho-social recovery and contributes to building inter-faith partnerships.
3. In June 2005, WV began the process of establishing conflict sensitivity staffing in Aceh. Peacebuilding was incorporated into the role of the zone-based Humanitarian Protection Officers, who were trained in November 2005 as DNH practitioners. These ten staff members ensure that humanitarian standards are met, and assist community members to acquire

²¹The shelter strategy was revised in year two, yet retained a strong link to DNH.

the government housing certificates that are required for rebuilding. Having DNH in the same department as humanitarian protection and advocacy staff allows team members to work together in an integrated way and facilitates rapid field-based identification of DNH issues, with an emphasis on land rights and shelter.

4. At the end of 2005, WV established a 2006 operating plan and a 2006-2009 strategy for Aceh that include a structured approach to DNH as a cross cutting theme. The staff team began to mainstream DNH using a structured approach to identify the relationship of each element of the project with the context of Aceh. DNH indicators have been incorporated into log frames to assist the monitoring of these activities.

By the second year of the tsunami response, the August 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) and the Government of Indonesia, plus the December 2005 hire of WV's Peacebuilding Team Leader²², allowed for accelerated progress. The MSTC was updated through an interim desk review in October 2005 and an inter-agency workshop in Banda Aceh in January 2006. Senior participants from both the National Office and Tsunami Response Team expressed interest in contributing to the Aceh peace process. As a result, community-level peace projects of a non-political nature, as well as selected peace advocacy interventions, were proposed for 2007.

Peacebuilding staff also began a series of local DNH assessments in all operating zones, focusing on shelter. The tension due to slow pace of construction, different types of housing, different types of housing for groups with different affiliations, economic benefits around building materials and different identities of people engaged in construction surfaced as key DNH issues. Peacebuilding staff became a key resource for managing complexity in delicate zones such as Lamno. During times of tension, they have been called on to facilitate communication with community and religious leaders,

analyse the local context, and advise on dispute resolution, security and staff support. There was also a significant capacity building effort in 2006, with DNH practitioners trained in the sectoral teams and operating zones.

As a Christian humanitarian organization working in conservative Muslim Aceh, WV requires a continuous intentional effort to build inter-faith understanding. WV does not proselytize and maintains that any use of humanitarian resources to influence a person to change his or her religion is unethical. Nonetheless some Christian groups operate under different policies, so this subject is understandably of concern to local communities and religious leaders. From the beginning of the response, WV's openness to recruit local Muslims as staff and to accommodate times of prayer has helped to ease the religious tension. More recently, WV also began to conduct cross-cultural orientation workshops for staff. Nonetheless, there is ongoing discussion around the compensation and advancement of locally hired staff, which in this case are predominantly Acehese Muslims.

Challenges. During the first year, implementation of the conflict sensitivity recommendations was significantly limited due to several factors:

1. Rotating staffing. This is often the case in large-scale emergencies, and particularly challenging in Aceh. Initially international staff was here only for a very short deployment, with little orientation or mandate for DNH or other cross-cutting themes. Likewise, the management teams to whom the original findings were presented in March and June 2005, and who endorsed many of the recommendations, subsequently left the programme. Key senior and DME positions were permanently filled at the end of 2005.

Conflict sensitivity staffing was similarly affected, despite the fact that WV Indonesia National Office is a conflict sensitivity leader within the WV Partnership. Several skilled National Office resource persons were deployed into tsunami response

operational roles with the assumption that they could also do something about conflict sensitivity, but in the end their time was not allocated for conflict sensitivity due to the prioritization of other operational demands. Thus during the first year, most conflict sensitivity achievements were serendipitous, depending on the interests and skills of individuals who happened to be present at a given key moment.

2. Competing initiatives and limited 'organizational space.' This is a challenge across the tsunami response, but particularly prominent in Aceh. Due to the complexity of the context, the Aceh programme has a large number of active sectors and cross-cutting themes, which tend to compete with each other for limited 'organizational space,' such as resources, time, staff attention and management support. Implementation pressures have been significant. At the same time, staff recruitment challenges have limited WV's capacity, with available resources being allocated to the priority shelter sector.

3. Limited access to the conflict assessment reports. Data summaries and management briefings were made available immediately after the assessments, but the final reports took three months to produce. Due to highly sensitive nature of the reports, distribution was limited, which unintentionally delayed or prevented key personnel from reading the documents. Since the internal conflict sensitivity point person was established in June 2005, the level of information sharing has steadily improved, leading to increased conflict sensitivity awareness among staff.

■ CASE STUDY: INDIA TSUNAMI RESPONSE

In the tsunami-affected zones of India, WV is working across five geographic areas, with goals emphasizing individual and community rehabilitation, shelter and infrastructure reconstruction, economic recovery, and women and health. This is part of the broader long-term community development efforts



of WV India. This case illustrates a first-time effort to apply DNH micro-analysis to a latent conflict context during the early phase of a large-scale emergency response.

Achievements. Conflict analysis to date has included two key phases:

- For the initial DNH assessment in March 2005, methodology included over twenty focus groups in five villages in Tamil Nadu State.
- The in-country conflict sensitivity advisor, working full time between July and October, conducted a series of DNH site visits, including well documented analysis and recommendations.

These analyses have consistently identified as a key priority the potential for overlooking marginalized and vulnerable groups in the inter-agency tsunami response. Any exclusion of individuals of lower castes, non-fishing occupations and women could unintentionally reinforce an existing climate of structural violence. Beginning in year one, significant numbers of the DNH recommendations were taken into consideration in the design of phase II and III programmes.

1. Gender Considerations. In the initial DNH assessment, it was highlighted that there was gender prejudice and a level of structural and personal violence against women in the target villages. In response, a significant number of activities for females were designed in the programme design. This included targeting provision of livelihood equipment in sectors traditionally occupied by women, as well as small-scale business entrepreneurship courses. Women's right awareness sessions and adolescent girls' protection workshops have also been included. Such plans were catalyzed by the DNH assessments and implemented under guidance of the gender advisor. Most monitoring indicators are tracked in a gender-disaggregated manner to ensure equal participation.

2. Diversification of economic recovery plans to non-fishing communities. To counter sense of frustration and jealousy of

non-fishing communities who were excluded from the general tsunami aid, WV diversified economic recovery plans to non-fishing communities. This included recovery assistance to indirectly-affected agriculturalists, as well as alternate livelihood skills training. Small shop vendors were targeted for grants to restart their businesses.

3. Shelter sector guidelines. On the basis of DNH assessments, WV developed customized sectoral guidelines for permanent shelter. This addressed issues related with beneficiary selection, inclusion of vulnerable groups, ownership and titling of houses, hand over procedures, and compliance with government and international standards.

4. Other related interventions. The high-priority psycho-social recovery project addresses the personal risks of vulnerable community members including women, children, disabled and marginalized, and alcohol awareness sessions have aimed to mitigate alcoholism as a significant contributor to community-level tensions. In phase III, WV also plans to provide peace education for children and community-based organizations.

Cuddalore District provides an example of how these programme design features have been implemented, particularly in the area of beneficiary selection. Conflict assessment in Akkaraigori village revealed a notable fear of continuing to live near the sea, and families wished to be relocated together. The marginalized families in this village had been missed in the initial phase of inter-agency relief. One local woman noted: "We would like to stay together, and we will move together. If we will not get any help, then we will stay here only and die together" (quoted in Solanki 2005).

Based on the conflict assessment report and shelter sector guidelines, the Cuddalore staff conducted a participatory re-assessment of the village for the permanent shelter phase, identifying a need for one hundred additional houses. WV staff brought the matter to the attention of the district government using focus group documentation including videotapes.

As a result, the one hundred marginalized families from Akkaraigori were included in the permanent housing.

The pre-tsunami existence of a small but growing pool of part-time DNH resource persons in the WV India National Office - and the willingness to deploy them for focused DNH work in the tsunami context - has made possible the series of high quality assessments underlying the programme design. More recently, in-country capacity building has included a three-day DNH practitioner training for selected programme designers and field operations managers.

Challenges. Conflict analysis has been conducted at the micro-level only. WV India could benefit from a macro-level analysis using the MSTC tools, but there were not enough skilled macro-level facilitators to deploy during the initial round. To compensate for this gap, the DNH micro analyses have been conducted in a high number of sites, and the results aggregated to identify priority high-level issues and trends. Nonetheless the lack of macro-analysis leaves some gaps in systemic understanding, and it is also likely that some important micro-level issues have been missed.

Most of WV's conflict-sensitive design decisions have been fully integrated into the programme monitoring system. An important exception may be the sectoral guidelines for permanent shelter. These were presented to field operations managers as a set of recommendations, not a mandate, in recognition that contextual constraints would make some of the guidelines difficult to achieve. As a result, it is not yet known how many project sites have implemented these recommendations in the manner of Cuddalore.

The India Tsunami Response was the first country programme to hire full time conflict sensitivity staff, and the results show up admirably in the second year programme designs. This staff member left the organization in October 2005, and the conflict sensitivity function was transferred to the programme design team. In the short-term, this resulted in a significant

loss of momentum, as the programme design team required four to six months to develop specialized skills as DNH resource persons. However this structure is made feasible by the relatively limited size and conflict risk in the India tsunami response. In the longer term the strong link between DNH and the programme design function is enabling a significant level of DNH in the programme design, monitoring and evaluation cycle.

The subtle, systemic nature of latent tensions in India's tsunami-affected zone makes the issues particularly delicate. Often it is difficult for stakeholders to recognize injustice within their own context or their own programme. This requires ongoing awareness raising to establish the importance of analyzing contexts and taking appropriate action to improve programme quality.

■ ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS IN TSUNAMI RESPONSE

This section identifies key conflict sensitivity achievements and challenges that are notable across the case studies of Sri Lanka, Aceh (Indonesia), and India, and the collective Asia Tsunami Response.

Achievements. In the first year of the multi-country tsunami response, conflict sensitivity contributed to shelter primarily at the conceptual level. In particular, WV staff became broadly aware of potential tensions between tsunami-affected and non-affected communities, and the importance of seeking not to exacerbate such tensions. Staff capacity was built and conflict assessment data was positioned as a foundation for year two. Year two reflects a more significant contribution to permanent shelter design, monitoring and evaluation, and some secondary expansion to other sectors. Though still working at the level of minimal standards, toward consistent implementation of 'do no harm,' this represents significant organizational progress beyond any previous Category III emergency. It has created ripple effects of increasing interest and demand around the WV International Partnership.

There have also been several forms of progress in conflict sensitivity methodology:

- Conducting MSTC macro and DNH micro analyses together, or back-to-back, allows the core findings of each analysis to shape and interpret the other.
- In addition to 'stand-alone' conflict assessments, conflict can be integrated into other types of assessment. Stand-alone assessments provide depth of understanding, which is essential in high risk contexts. Integrated assessments provide breadth of understanding and smooth DME integration.
- Promising staffing models include placement of part-time DNH focal points in each geographic zone, supported by full-time conflict sensitivity advisor(s).
- Field-based staff can be equipped with sector-specific tools customized on the basis of conflict assessment findings, such as the India shelter guidelines and the Lanka household assessment.
- Conflict assessment timing is increasingly synchronized with LEAP cycle, particularly the scheduled windows of assessment and re-design. This is supplemented with responsive analysis when 'hot spots' arise in the field.
- WV's participatory DNH assessment methods, as developed in ADPs, can be adapted for use in emergencies. However, while community members are at risk and under stress, they may have limited interest in conflict assessment. Thus in early stages community members may participate primarily by contributing information. As soon as possible, the assessments should shift to become truly community-based, with participants 'owning' the findings and decisions. Community members can indicate when they are ready to make this shift.

Challenges. Despite these advances, the majority of the conflict assessment recommendations developed during the initial months of the response were not addressed until the second year of the programme, if at all. Thus conflict sensitivity did not influence year one implementation as significantly as intended through either strategic positioning or programme design. It is vital to understand the reason for these delays, in order to improve future responses. Hindering factors have included the following.

1. Lack of conflict sensitivity work during the emergency preparedness phase. During the first month of the response, it would not have been realistic for the Global Rapid Response Team or other early responders, working within the limitations of existing staffing systems, to conduct in-depth conflict assessment. If there had been a pre-existing body of data, this could have informed conflict-sensitive decision-making. In Aceh, this would have been impossible, as WV did not have operational presence prior to the tsunami. In other countries, WV was operational, but recent conflict sensitivity assessments had not been conducted near the tsunami-affected zones, despite some National Offices having high quality peace-building projects.

2. Incomplete decision-making and implementation. Conflict sensitivity requires four basic steps. First, there is a management decision to pursue conflict sensitivity and to acquire the necessary resource persons. Second, conflict assessments are conducted, leading to recommendations for strategic positioning and programme design. Simultaneous awareness raising among staff helps to facilitate uptake of the assessment findings. ATRT has made unprecedented progress on these first two steps, albeit with some significant delays.

Challenges remain in the third step, which requires management review and decision making on conflict assessment recommendations, and the fourth step, which requires implementation of the decisions. As described in each case study,

despite completing the initial conflict assessments by March 2005, there was little immediate uptake of the recommendations, and the window for strategic positioning and year one programme design was missed. This is attributed to two inter-related factors:

- **Inconsistent management review and accountability.**
The typical conflict assessment process has ended with management briefings, and has not extended to purposive decision making on which recommendations to implement. There are no defined mechanisms to support conflict sensitivity decision making, and few points of accountability to enforce the decisions once taken. This is symptomatic of broader systemic issues, in that current organizational processes sometimes result in programme decisions that are based on resource flows rather than field evidence. The decision-making challenges are further complicated by the involvement of multiple organizational power centers, and exacerbated by the perception that conflict sensitivity can be done by a few technical staff without active engagement of others in the organization. In a few cases, tsunami response senior leaders did enthusiastically approve recommendations, but they left due to high turnover before their decisions could be implemented. As a result, decision-making and implementation has required protracted makeshift negotiations with individual managers throughout the organization, and results have been widely varied.
- **Inconsistent follow-up from conflict sensitivity resource persons.** The February-March 2006 assessment facilitators were on short-term deployment and departed following the management briefings, in many cases to facilitate other assessments. In the early stages, in-country conflict sensitivity 'point persons' were not yet in place to facilitate the process of management review. This meant that recommendations were forwarded en masse to senior leadership teams, with limited follow-up

to catalyze and assist their decision-making. Further, many recommendations were not presented directly to the staff most empowered to act on a particular issue, who are often in less senior roles such as field coordinators, programme designers, sector advisors etc. Thus uptake of assessment recommendations finally began in July 2005 when in-country 'point persons' were identified to facilitate the time-consuming process of customizing recommendations for decision-makers scattered throughout the organization. Many of these in-country 'point persons' were located in humanitarian accountability units, which appears to increase overall organizational capacity for following up programme quality issues.

3. Competing initiatives and limited 'organizational space.' Most tsunami response staff will accept conflict sensitivity at the conceptual level, but find it difficult to implement in light of operational constraints. WV's many initiatives and 'cross-cutting themes' compete with each other for very limited 'organizational space,' such as resources, time, staff attention and management support.

Contextual analysis is often weak, so there is little basis for understanding the local outworkings of the cross-cutting themes, all of which function uniquely in different places and times. When such context analysis is conducted, it is usually focused on a single theme, and inter-related issues and synergies (e.g. violence against children from marginalized identity groups) are not captured. As a result, there is no mechanism for prioritizing and sequencing cross-cutting themes on the basis of what is needed in a given context.

Instead, the cross-cutting themes that make aggressive proposals at opportune moments gain organizational space, and the losers are relegated to afterthought or obligatory 'check-box.' The level of investment is sometimes inconsistent with the context. For example, conflict sensitivity should be a

high priority in war-affected Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka, and a medium priority for Thailand and India given their significant latent tensions. However this did not occur operationally, as conflict sensitivity progressed most quickly in India.

There have also been dilemmas regarding appropriate timing. In the first days of rapid response there are significant logistical - and some would add ethical - constraints in dedicating resources to conflict assessment. Nonetheless in contexts where conflict is a high priority, conflict sensitivity should begin quickly enough to influence the strategic positioning that takes place with the first effort at planning toward recovery. Key decisions at this stage - such as selecting operating zones, sectors and target groups - often have a large impact on conflict. Conflict sensitivity is greatly diminished if this window is missed, because such high-level decisions are difficult to change once programme implementation has begun. In contrast, explicit peacebuilding activities can be considered optional in later transitional phases.

In the tsunami response, the timing of the initial conflict assessments in February and March 2005 was early enough to have significant influence on strategic positioning and programme design. However, the strategic positioning window was largely missed due to the incomplete 'operationalisation' of the recommendations. Arguably, in Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka the methodology of the initial conflict assessments (March 2006) may have been heavier than necessary, because the level of human resource investment proved greater than the existing absorptive capacity of the organization to quickly take up the recommendations. True uptake did not begin until at least four months later.

The prioritization and timing debates have been heavily influenced by pressure for rapid results. In year one, financial pressure was a key factor across all country programmes. Mid-way through year two, most implementation pressures had eased, and there was a strong mandate for programme

quality. Nonetheless, it would take some time for these changes to ripple through the system, influencing organizational culture and staff behavior.

A common concern about conflict sensitivity in emergency response is the perception that "we don't have time." Time pressure is indeed a significant factor, which needs to be factored into conflict sensitivity planning. Nonetheless, the perceived lack of time usually indicates a lack of something else, such as clear priorities, sufficient resources or appropriate methodologies. Additionally, in some contexts conflict sensitivity may slow implementation, but in other cases it is equally likely to prevent delay, while also improving programme impact. Shelter implementation has often been delayed by community-level disputes, many of which might be mitigated through the application of DNH.

4. Limited awareness and information sharing. Conflict sensitivity awareness has significantly increased, yet there is still a need to orient managers and field staff to DNH concepts and issues. In the tsunami response, this consumed a considerable amount of energy in year one. The one-day managers' orientation module was intended to raise such awareness but time pressures made it challenging to schedule during the first year. This orientation would be better done in the preparedness phase, particularly for staff that are on 'stand by' for emergency deployment.

There is also a need to improve sharing of conflict assessment findings within the country programmes. Most importantly, the role of the conflict sensitivity point person internal to the programme is indispensable in facilitating this process. The learnings need to be circulated more than once, in both written and verbal form, given the rapid rotation of staff. In some cases, there is need for abridged, less sensitive versions of the reports for dissemination purposes.

Secondarily, the security protocols for document sharing can be reviewed and streamlined. WV's early experience with

MSTC opened new discussion on highly sensitive issues, so National Directors were designated as gate-keepers and distribution was limited.

The newly emerging practice is to establish protocols at the National Director level, and then delegate selected managers to facilitate broader distribution. Permissions are approved on basis of position, rather than individual names, in order to cope with turnover.

The tsunami response in the context of the 'new humanitarianism.' On the whole, the tsunami learnings indicate that WV is grappling with the risk of organizational overload associated with the 'new humanitarianism.' Adding new expectations, even essential expectations, has inevitable constraints in a limited-capacity environment.

At times the "collective groan" (Barbolet et al. 2005:6) among tsunami response staff has been almost audible. This does not imply that the obligation to 'do no harm' can be de-emphasized. Rather, it implies the need to ensure that conflict sensitivity efforts are made practical through advance preparation, prioritization of tasks based on solid context analysis, and streamlining of conflict sensitivity activities in the early phases of emergencies. At the institutional level, there is a parallel need for accountability in ensuring that WV's commitment to 'do no harm' is consistently operationalised.

Parallel challenges are notable at the interagency level. Immediately after the tsunami, there was much fervent discussion about 'doing no harm,' and speculation about whether this disaster and humanitarian response might help to bridge divisions and catalyze peace negotiations in Aceh Province, Indonesia and in Sri Lanka. One year later, while acknowledging the limitations of the NGO role, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition stated that: "Overall . . . the international tsunami response missed the opportunity to address issues of equity, conflict, gender and governance in an integrated and holistic

way" (Cosgrave 2005:12). Thus the aid community continues to pursue an expanded humanitarianism, even as it struggles with the practicalities of follow-through and implementation.

There is much celebration of the positive contributions of the international community to the Aceh peace process, though in fact the back-channel peace negotiations had begun well before the tsunami.

There is less interagency reflection on the relationship of tsunami aid to Sri Lanka's current downward spiral. At community level, "the uneven distributional effects of aid have exacerbated a range of ethnic, political and social tensions" (Goodhand et al. 2005:59).

At the donor level, it was hoped that negotiations on the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) would help to re-open peace talks, but instead P-TOMS has become a casualty of politics and an added source of tension.

It would be grossly overstating the case to say that P-TOMS caused the current escalation, as the causes are multi-faceted and the Lanka peace process was stalled prior to the tsunami. Nonetheless, the Lanka tsunami response has become entangled with violence in a particularly visible manner that should give pause for reflection.

VI. Potential Future Directions

WV has gained enough experience with conflict sensitivity in emergency response to begin identifying potential directions for the organization's future. This section combines established good practices, tested to varying degrees in the Asia-Pacific region, with some untested projections of how WV might overcome the challenges encountered in tsunami response.

Conflict sensitivity and relief practitioners have collaborated to identify these directions. Thus the resulting insights do not necessarily represent a 'purist' perspective on either discipline, but rather a pragmatic effort to identify what consistently works in promoting programme quality in challenging operational contexts. The potential directions are summarized in the overview table below, and described in detail in the pages that follow.

PHASE 1: DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Conflict sensitivity in disaster preparedness is currently very limited and has the potential to move WV forward with far-reaching results. Among National Offices that address conflict sensitivity in community development contexts, links to disaster preparedness and emergency response are often weak. In other cases, some National Offices have not yet addressed conflict sensitivity at all. Thus only a small handful of Initial Disaster Preparedness Plans have considered conflict issues in any form.

At the National Office level, preparedness could be improved by including a Conflict Vulnerability Analysis in early stage planning, to examine the contextual risk of violent conflict, latent conflict and escalation. This would inform the Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan, as well as the National Office

strategy and associated security plans. Vulnerability to violent conflict can be re-examined each time the disaster preparedness plan is updated, thus keeping relatively current on a rolling basis.

Such Conflict Vulnerability Analysis would allow WV to identify where the risk of destructive conflict is significant, and to prioritize conflict sensitivity preparedness work in those locations.

- Conflict sensitivity resource persons are hired or developed
- Collaborative agreements are established between emergency response and conflict sensitivity teams
- Conflict assessments (DNH, iPad, and/or MSTC) support ongoing community development programming. If this data is up-to-date, it can be utilized at the onset of emergency.

Relief staff caution that preparedness plans are mere documents, which must be brought to life through the development of human capacity. Among NOs that use disaster preparedness capacity assessments, these can be expanded to track the conflict sensitivity skills of staff responders vis a vis the needs of their operating context. DNH capacity building can also be offered to community leaders during the process of community-based disaster preparedness planning and/or vulnerabilities and capacities analyses²³.

In terms of global preparedness, WV needs to significantly enlarge its cadre of conflict sensitivity resource persons.

²³Resources for community-based vulnerabilities and capacities analysis has been most fully developed by the WV Regional Relief Teams in Africa.

Table 1: Overview of potential Future Directions

	Phase 1: Disaster Preparedness	Phase 2: Rapid Response	Phase 3: Strategic Re-positioning & Planning	Phase 4: Ongoing Implementation & Re-development
KEY QUESTIONS	What is the risk of violent conflict in this context? Are there latent tensions vulnerable to escalation? How can WV development programmes mitigate these risks and promote sustainable peace? How would WV address conflict in case of emergency?	What is the most dangerous social division in this context? What are the risks of exacerbating this division, and how can we avoid it?	Which cross-cutting themes have highest priority in this context? How should CS influence positioning decisions (e.g. geographic zones, sectors, target groups, partners)? How should CS influence programme design in high-risk sectors and sites?	How should CS influence programme design across all sectors and sites? How can DNH capacity be strengthened among field staff and community members? To what extent will WV integrate peacebuilding as part of the transition to development?
METHODS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conflict vulnerability analysis informs national strategy, initial disaster preparedness plan and security plans If conflict is priority, then: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collaboration is established between relief and CS staff - Conflict assessments support development programmes If conflict is not priority, it receives continued lower-level attention as a secondary theme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-existing conflict assessment data informs decision-making Pre-trained generalists and sectoral staff apply DNH to own role If such resources are not available, seek external assessment data and expedite recruitment of CS resource persons. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrated Context Analysis includes violent and latent conflict. Cross-cutting themes are prioritized and sequenced per importance and urgency. If conflict is priority, then stand-alone conflict assessments inform strategic positioning, programme design and monitoring, and potentially advocacy. This begins with high-risk sectors and sites, and synchronizes with LEAP. If conflict is not priority, it receives continued lower-level attention as a secondary theme. 	<p>If conflict is a priority, then:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iterative stand-alone conflict assessments synchronized with LEAP cycle. Frequency determined by level of conflict risk, and rate of context change. Monitoring options Organizational process, programme impact, context. Transition options: DNH capacity building for CBOs. Conflict sensitivity becomes a foundation for peacebuilding.
TOOLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MSTC, iPad & DNH 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-existing CS data 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrated Context Analysis MSTC; DNH with limited community participation Option: Rapid Social Impact Eval. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MSTC; DNH with increasing community ownership Customized field implementation tools e.g. 'Do No Harm' checklist high-risk sectors iPAD is (re)introduced to support transition to development
CONFLICT SENSITIVITY STAFFING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CS resource persons in Global Emergency Response Network available for deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CS resource persons in Global Emergency Response Network available for deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rapid short-term deployment of CS resource person(s) @ 100% OR Integrated Context Analysis team In-country CS 'point person' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long-term hire of CS advisor(s) @ 100% Capacity building for part-time field-based CS resource persons
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rapid responders and relief managers receive CS orientation, can access CS resource persons DNH practitioner skills training for selected generalists and sectoral staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HR begins recruitment of CS resource persons for next phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management review and decision-making on CS recommendations. Collaboration of relief team & N.O. CS linked to security, staff care and cross-cultural training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management review and decision-making on CS recs. CS orientation for managers; practitioner skills training for selected generalists and sectoral staff

WV's Global Emergency Response Network cannot rely solely on existing resource persons, since demand increasingly exceeds supply. There is some shortage of DNH trainers, and a more serious shortage of assessment facilitators in DNH, iPad and MSTC. The development of such resource persons requires not only intensive training, but also consistent follow-up and mentoring. WV's Regional Relief Teams are a promising focal point for this capacity building investment, because they are relatively stable, and able to influence both preparedness and response in emergencies ranging from Category I to Category III.

Additionally, action is needed to increase the deployability of the conflict sensitivity resource persons that do exist. Rapid responders and relief managers need conflict sensitivity orientation during the preparedness phase, e.g. through the HEA Induction Format, including the knowledge of how to access conflict sensitivity resource persons as part of the rapid deployment system.

With information provided by WVI Pax Net, the Global Relief Register can list staff with specialty skills in conflict sensitivity, undergirded by a clear definition of capacity standards. The Relief Forum database can provide recruiters with sample Terms of Reference and Job Descriptions (see Annex C) for deployments. This must be accompanied by a managerial commitment to release conflict sensitivity resources persons for deployment, which sometimes imposes a temporary strain on the sending offices.

Finally, there is an ongoing need to train selected generalists and sectoral staff as skilled DNH practitioners. This provides programme designers and field implementers with sufficient capacity to identify key issues using the DNH 'lens,' conduct a basic analysis, and make informed decisions within the scope of their own programme. Field-level implementation decisions can have a significant impact on conflict sensitivity, even if they are considered too 'small' to appear in the programme design documents.

PHASE 2: RAPID RESPONSE

This phase focuses on meeting immediate needs, and the planning horizon is correspondingly short. There are significant operational barriers in conducting analysis during very early phases. This is also the subject of some ethical debate, with many relief practitioners stating that it is unethical to conduct conflict analysis while lives are still at risk, and conflict sensitivity practitioners responding that, over the slightly longer term, people's lives may in fact be at risk due to violent conflict. Both points of view have validity, and it is clear that during the rapid response phase, organizational resources are stretched to the maximum. The length of this phase varies, and transition points are gradual. In the tsunami response, the rapid response phase lasted just over one month.

If conflict sensitivity work is done in the preparation phase, then effective minimalist approaches to conflict sensitivity are quite feasible in the rapid response phase. At this stage, there should be a streamlined focus on identifying the most dangerous social division and avoiding actions that exacerbate it. Previously existing conflict assessment data can inform high-level decisions from the earliest stage, as seen in the Cambodia case study. In some cases a conflict sensitivity resource person could help re-interpret the existing assessment data in light of rapid contextual changes. Also, rapid responders who have been trained as DNH practitioners can apply this 'lens' within the scope of their own role, as seen in the Philippines case study.

If a conflict sensitivity foundation was not established in the preparedness phase, then conflict sensitivity during the rapid response phase will be exceptionally difficult. There are some remedial actions that can and should be attempted, but each has limitations. For example, conflict assessment data from external sources can be utilized. However, in many contexts such external data is rare, and it does not always include the components needed for humanitarian planning. Conflict sensitivity resource persons can be deployed from other

locations. However due to deployment lags and limitations on 'organizational space' during the Rapid Response phase, their true contribution often does not become evident until the next phase of Strategic Re-positioning and Planning.

When conflict sensitivity is missed during the Rapid Response Phase, there is a significant cost in terms of unintended negative consequences. Decisions taken during this phase shape the entry and strategic positioning of the organization and the parameters of the programme, which can have a profound impact on conflict. Strategic Re-positioning in the next phase provides a valuable opportunity for course correction and improvement, but it cannot undo the effects of actions previously taken.

These sobering realities again point strongly to the importance of conflict sensitivity efforts in the Disaster Preparedness Phase, to ensure that assessment data and staff capacity are in place in high-risk zones. Preparedness is challenging in geographic areas where WV does not have a presence prior to the disaster, and in some cases of rapid onset natural disasters. However it is rare for conflict emergencies to have a truly rapid onset, because latent tensions are detectable and escalating prior to outbreaks of violence. WV can and should work toward getting prepared for conflict sensitivity in such emergencies.

PHASE 3: STRATEGIC RE-POSITIONING AND PLANNING

Timing varies, but there is a consistently recognized shift when rapid response gives way to forward planning, including high-level decisions about the recovery phase. This is often called strategic positioning, but it is more accurately a re-positioning, as it builds upon the positioning decisions already taken during the Rapid Response Phase. In the tsunami response, this phase began four to six weeks after the disaster. Conflict sensitivity during this phase should inform key high-level decisions such as the selection of operating zones, sectors, target groups and partners. If conflict sensitivity work was not conducted during the Rapid Response phase, then Strategic Re-positioning also presents an opportunity for course correction.

However, it must be recognized that conflict sensitivity is not an equally high priority in every context. Depending on local dynamics, conflict may be a top priority in one context, while another of WV's cross-cutting themes, such as environment or gender, is the priority elsewhere. It is not realistic to give top priority to all of these elements in the early phases of relief, nor is it essential to do so, because the priority issues do vary according to context. Additionally, the sequencing requirements of each theme will be different, because some are extremely time-sensitive, while others can reasonably be delayed. Such decisions require a solid context analysis, which is acknowledged as a foundational element of LEAP, but remains quite underdeveloped.

Thus there is growing interest in piloting the practice of Integrated Context Analysis to examine a broad range of 'soft' themes. This would include, but not be limited to, issues of destructive conflict. Such an integrated analysis would assess the risk of violent and latent conflict together with all other cross-cutting themes, allowing these themes to be prioritized and sequenced, and the synergies between them identified. The strength of such an integrated analysis is breadth, not depth. Nonetheless, it must be robust enough to identify key high-level issues on priority themes in order to inform decisions on strategic positioning and/or re-positioning.

- Public recognition of existing violence and latent conflict vulnerable to escalation
- The disaster disproportionately affects one identity group more than others
- Aid distribution is significantly or increasingly influenced by partisan politics
- The operating context is new to WV, or is rapidly changing
- The emergency response is large in scope, which magnifies its social impacts

Where conflict is identified as a priority, the programme

should move as quickly as possible into a series of stand-alone conflict assessments, synchronized with the LEAP cycle. Such stand-alone assessments provide the deeper understanding necessary for conflict sensitivity in ongoing strategic positioning, and early-stage programme design and monitoring. They may also become a valuable source of information for advocacy needs identification and planning. Tools include MSTC at the macro level, and DNH at the micro level, beginning with the highest-risk sectors and programme sites. Short-term deployment of conflict sensitivity resource persons can launch this process, while the longer-term appointments are under recruitment. Inter-agency analyses can be a key service supported by WV.

Conflict assessment processes should not be considered complete until managers have reviewed and made decisions regarding the recommendations. In some cases this calls for a 'paradigm shift': staffing and assessment cannot significantly advance conflict sensitivity in the absence of management engagement and decision-making. Conflict sensitivity resource persons can streamline the process by prioritizing recommendations according to impact and time-sensitivity, and by tailoring recommendations to the appropriate decision-making level. In the case of short-term deployments, resource persons should remain on-site until the management decisions are made, and follow-up is handed off to an internal goal owner.

Once management decisions are made, conflict sensitivity can be integrated in multiple ways into the design, monitoring and evaluation system:

- Conflict sensitivity shapes programme outcomes, outputs and activities (e.g. diversification of economic recovery plans to non-fishing communities, as practiced in the India case study)
- Conflict sensitivity is reflected in choice of indicators (e.g. disaggregation of beneficiaries by ethnic group, as indicated in the Sri Lanka case study)

- Programme monitoring uses selected indicators to track how the programme is affecting the context of conflict (i.e. what is the impact of our programmatic decisions on inter-group relationships?)
- Context monitoring uses selected indicators to track trends (i.e. to identify escalating tensions in a high-risk geographic zone)
- Process indicators track organizational accountability (i.e. to what extent have the conflict sensitivity decisions actually been implemented?)

If conflict sensitivity (or any other cross-cutting theme) is not a high priority in a given context, it should nonetheless continue to receive lower-level attention. Prioritization assists in determining emphasis and sequencing, but is not a justification for dropping any cross-cutting theme. For example, where conflict is a lower priority, there may be no need for stand-alone conflict assessments. Instead, a few conflict-related questions can be regularly integrated into other types of assessments, allowing WV to detect any increase in tensions. Staff DNH capacity can be built later, and at less demanding levels. DNH orientation may be the primary emphasis, with relatively few staff trained as skilled practitioners or resource persons. Resource persons may be part-time, rather than full-time advisors. Each programme leadership team would make their own prioritization decisions based on field evidence.

In Category III emergencies, collaboration between the emergency response teams and other National Office is particularly critical during the Strategic Re-positioning and Planning Phase. Conflict risk in the operating context affects both programmes equally, and unintentional harm can compromise the security of local actors for years to come. Joint conflict assessment exercises are one way to support integrated longer-term planning. Additional considerations during this phase include the optional use of 'Rapid Social Impact Evaluation' (as seen in the Cambodia case study and Annex B),

and the linkage of conflict sensitivity to staff care, security and cross-cultural training as needed per the context.

PHASE 4: ONGOING IMPLEMENTATION AND REDESIGN

This phase includes a number of programmatic sub-phases, which are combined here because at this point conflict sensitivity work can become more routinised. Where conflict is identified as a priority, stand-alone assessments continue in synchronization with the LEAP cycle. This must be repeated on an iterative basis because conflict dynamics, and their interaction with the relief programme, will change over time. The appropriate interval varies widely depending on the level of conflict risk and the rate of observed contextual change. Conflict assessments can also be scheduled on a responsive basis, when 'hot spots' arise in the field.

MSTC and DNH continue as key tools, with the addition of the following:

- On the basis of conflict assessment data, resource persons can customize context-specific field implementation tools for use by generalists and sectoral staff. This helps staff to improve impact on conflict even prior to being introduced to DNH. The shelter sector guidelines in the India case study provide a good example.
- iPad is (re)introduced to support transitions toward community development, meso-level programme integration, and integration of implicit peacebuilding.

Maintaining conflict sensitivity as a priority usually requires the longer-term appointment of at least one conflict sensitivity advisor at one hundred percent time allocation. As time pressure decreases, it also becomes feasible to develop an internal cadre of staff who work on conflict sensitivity on a part-time basis, assuming they have coordination and mentoring from the full-time advisor.

In this phase as well as preparedness, DNH training can also be very valuable for community-based organizations. Testing in the ADP centers of learning in Mindanao and Sulawesi, plus other subsequent experiences around the Region, has demonstrated that DNH is simple enough for quick CBO uptake, and powerful enough to significantly improve programme quality at the grassroots level. (See, for example, Garred ed. 2006).

VII. Implications for World Vision

The potential directions identified above have been discussed with interested World Vision staff in the Asia Tsunami Response programme, as well as the global peacebuilding and relief networks, including the May 2006 Global Relief Forum. Most of the promising practices were considered useful for improving conflict sensitivity. However three opportunities in particular have consistently been identified as most relevant to the current 'felt needs' of WV practitioners.

1. *Emphasize conflict sensitivity in the Disaster Preparedness Phase*
2. *Develop and test the possibility of Integrated Context Analysis.*
3. *Nurture a 'culture of analysis' within the organization*
The organizational implications of pursuing these opportunities are explored briefly in this section by way of conclusion.

1. Emphasize conflict sensitivity in the Disaster Preparedness Phase. The six Asia cases point to pre-emergency preparation as the key factor in beginning conflict sensitivity early enough to influence emergency response strategic positioning and programme design. This paper's emphasis on improving preparedness does not imply that disaster preparedness and conflict sensitivity activities are not taking place. In fact, both types of activity are taking place, sometimes in significant numbers. Nonetheless conflict sensitivity assessments and capacity building events, which are often undertaken by peacebuilding and/or community development staff, are usually not intentionally integrated with WV's disaster preparedness and rapid response systems.

This situation illustrates the need to develop nodes of consistent collaboration between WVI Pax Net and emergency response programme planners, and also between WVI Pax Net and the rapid response recruitment systems. Again, Regional Relief Teams are proposed as one promising focal point for linkage and investment, because they are relatively stable in nature and are positioned to contribute to emergencies of all stages and sizes. To the extent that this represents an expansion of responsibility for WVI Pax Net, the network would need to be appropriately resourced to provide capacity building and information sharing to the emergency response system.

2. Develop and test the possibility of Integrated Context Analysis. Staff consultations around this conflict sensitivity paper have repeatedly led to the broader issue of actively understanding the operating context. Several staff commented that conflict analysis has gained a rapid WV following in part because it is the only form of context analysis that is consistently available to operational staff. This implies that WV must strengthen its approach to context analysis, and that such analysis must be robust and active enough to influence decision making.

Integrated Context Analysis is proposed as a way of better understanding the macro-level context, and equipping staff to make sense of the overwhelming number of initiatives that have proliferated under the 'new humanitarianism.' Users of such a tool would be able to prioritize, sequence and synergize among WV's cross-cutting themes. This idea generates much energy in staff discussion, because it holds the potential to help convert WV's good mainstreaming intentions into

action. Such an approach would be applicable in both the Disaster Preparedness and Strategic Re-Positioning Phases.

This proposal implies the creation of new tools for Integrated Context Analysis. MSTC would likely have something to contribute, as would existing tools from other communities of practice. The effort would require bringing together a group of technical advisors on each of the cross-cutting themes, together with one or more experts in design, monitoring and evaluation, for a joint process of tool development, testing and application. This group would likely be convened under the auspices of the LEAP process, which is currently harmonizing DME efforts around the WVI Partnership.

Integrated Context Analysis is promising, but it also merits a word of caution. While it is useful to identify which cross-cutting themes hold priority in a given place and time, none of WV's established cross-cutting themes can be ignored. Lower priority themes should not be disregarded, but should receive disciplined secondary attention on an ongoing basis. The context must also be monitored on an ongoing or rolling basis, because future changes might alter the relative prioritization among cross-cutting themes.

3. Nurture a 'culture of analysis' within the organization.


Significantly, both relief and conflict sensitivity staff have emphasized that if WV is to maximize these opportunities, there is need to nurture a 'culture of analysis'²⁴ the organization, which systematizes and rewards relief programme decision-making that is firmly based on field evidence. This would increase the 'organizational space' available for processing conflict sensitivity issues, and contribute to improved decision-maker review and accountable uptake of conflict sensitivity assessment recommendations. It would also release more time allocation and funding for the development of staff capacity in context analysis, including but not limited to issues of peace and conflict.

This observation is clearly systemic in nature, and it parallels

the call of Barbolet et al. (2005:6) to develop a broad organizational ethos, integrating peace-promoting attitudes and approaches into every aspect of the organization's culture, systems and processes. Development of organizational culture is clearly a challenging long-term process requiring strong leadership at every level. It is interesting to note that WV's global 'Our Future' effort, which currently aims to bring greater focus to the work of the entire Partnership, has identified several themes that parallel those suggested by this paper's programme-level case studies. Such emerging organizational development priorities include leadership focus on setting priorities and making "decisions that stick" (WVI 2006).

If pursued, these three opportunities would help move WV toward future emergency responses that replicate and improve upon the conflict sensitivity progress shown in the case studies of North Maluku (Indonesia), the Philippines, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Aceh (Indonesia) and India. The current challenge remains to become fully consistent in 'doing no harm,' by integrating conflict sensitivity early enough to influence strategic positioning and programme design. This can be considered a minimal standard, yet its effects are far reaching in terms of improving programme impact at community level. Building on this foundation, WV would also be better positioned to contribute where appropriate to active initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

²⁴The phrase 'culture of analysis' was proposed by Practice Group participants during the Global Relief Forum. The same need has been consistently described by Pax Net and ATRT staff, albeit using alternate terminology.



Artwork by Adi Coret.

Adi was mentored as a painter by Round Kelana of Banda Aceh. When the tsunami hit, Adi was swept up in the water and lost all of his possessions, including his painting materials. The canvas that this painting is on was also a survivor of the water. This painting is the image that Adi has in his mind of seeing the waves coming and taking all the people who were in front of him, especially the women. World Vision met Adi and his fellow painters during the Do No Harm Assessment community consultations in March 2005.

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
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Annex A - “The ‘Do No Harm’ Framework”

Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict

CONTEXT of CONFLICT



Source: Anderson 1999

Annex B - Sample Tool

Rapid Social Impact Evaluation of White Rice Distribution WV Cambodia 2004

Note: The questions below are customized to the Cambodian context (see case study), and should be very carefully adapted prior to use in any other location.

Distribution Date:

Received Families:

Non-Beneficiary Interview

1. What is your idea/comment on the distribution recently done by WV Cambodia? _____
2. Did you know why the beneficiaries were selected to be beneficiaries? Why were you not included in the list?
How do you feel? _____
3. Are there any families in your community who should receive rice that you think were left out from the list?
How many? Why? How is their standard of living? _____
4. Are there any families on the list that were changed or replaced by others? If yes, why and how? _____
5. Did you notice any conflict or jealousies happening during and/or after food distribution? If yes, between whom?
About what? Who helped in resolving the conflicts? How did the Village Development Committees and WV staff avoid this conflict? _____
6. Have any problems occurred in rice or material distribution in the past?
What can the villagers or WV Cambodia do in the future to avoid such problems? _____
7. What is your idea on the beneficiaries' selection? Who are the selectors? And how did they make the selections? _____
8. Do you have any comment to improve beneficiaries' selection? _____
9. Do you know what the beneficiaries did with the rice? How did they use it? _____
10. Do you have any suggestions or comments? _____

Beneficiary Interview

1. What is your idea/comment on the distribution recently done by WV Cambodia? _____
2. Did you know why you were selected to receive rice? _____
3. Are there any families in your community who should receive rice that you think were left out from the list?
How many? Why? How is their standard of living? _____
4. Are there any families on the list that were changed or replaced by others? If yes, why and how? _____
5. Did you notice any conflict or jealousies happening during and/or after food distribution? If yes, between whom?
About what? Who helped in resolving the conflicts? How did the Village Development Committees and WV staff avoid this conflict?
 - Is there anyone angry with you or jealous of you as the beneficiary of this programme? Who? About what? _____
6. Have any problems occurred in rice distributions in the past? What can the villagers or WVC do in the future to avoid such problems? _____

7. What is your idea on the beneficiaries' selection? Who are the selectors? And how did they make the selections?
8. Do you have any comment to improve beneficiaries' selection?
9. How will the free rice relief help your family? How long will you use it?
10. Has anyone asked you to share the rice with neighbors or non-beneficiaries?
11. How is the quality of the rice?
12. Do you have any suggestions or comments?

Village Development Committee Interview

1. What is your idea/comment on the distribution recently done by WV Cambodia?
2. How did you select the beneficiaries? Who was involved in beneficiaries selection and wealth ranking in your village? What is your feeling about the selection process?
3. Do you have any comment to improve beneficiary selection? Who should be involved in beneficiary selection to make it fairer, and to avoid conflict and jealousy?
4. Are there any families in your community who should receive rice that you think were left out from the list? How many? Why? How is their standard of living?
 - Did any family ask to have their name added to the list after coupons were distributed? If so, why, and how is their standard of living?
5. Are there any families on the list that were changed or replaced by others? If yes, why and how?
6. Did you notice any conflict or jealousies happening during and/or after food distribution? If yes, between whom? About what? Who helped in resolving the conflicts? How did the Village Development Committees and WV staff avoid this conflict?
7. Have any problems occurred during rice or materials distribution in the past? What can the villagers or WV Cambodia do in the future to avoid such problems?
8. Do you know what the beneficiaries did with the rice? How did they use it?
9. Do you have any suggestions and comments?

Staff Interview

1. Do you have any idea related to drought response?
2. Do you have any idea related to information sharing, process, open meeting with villagers, and support from the Emergency Response Team? Were the instructions clear?
3. Do you know how the community selected beneficiaries in your target area?
4. Are there any problems that make this process not work properly? If so, what is your idea to improve it?
5. Do you think that your beneficiary selection process resulted in negative impact or social conflict in your target area? If yes, what we should do to strengthen capacity?
6. Do you have any suggestions or comments?

Annex C - Sample Job Description

Conflict Sensitivity Advisor (In-Country, Full-Time)

Purpose: Provide conflict analysis and capacity building services using 'Do No Harm' and related tools, to inform operational decision-making in zones of violent and latent conflict, and enable systematic integration of conflict-sensitive practice in programme design, monitoring and evaluation. This position operates within an assigned geographic zone, in collaboration with the Regional Conflict Sensitivity Manager.

Responsibilities:

1. Lead programme-level analyses using Do No Harm / Local Capacities for Peace (DNH) and Integrating Peacebuilding and Development (iPAD) tools, through methods including desk review, staff team analysis and community-based assessment with a qualified partner.
2. Contribute to the facilitation and updating of macro-level analyses using tool Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC), in collaboration with the Regional Conflict Sensitivity Manager.
3. Document and disseminate context analysis, operational implications and conflict-sensitive programming options in 'user-friendly' formats. Assist decision makers throughout the organization to consider and take up assessment recommendations.
4. Build staff capacity in Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace through awareness raising, tool dissemination, mentoring and skills training with a qualified partner.
5. Work closely with operational, sectoral and senior managers to support the systemic integration of conflict-sensitive practice in programme design, monitoring and evaluation, using the WV LEAP Framework.
6. Advise operational, sectoral and senior managers on programming options for contexts of violent and latent conflict, identification of conflict-related advocacy issues, and opportunities for peacebuilding.
7. Collaborate with WV conflict sensitivity staff based in other countries on selected organizational learning projects, as coordinated by the Regional Conflict Sensitivity Manager.
8. Participate in inter-agency networks and coalitions focused on conflict-sensitive programming. Contribute to inter-agency trainings, analyses and/or resource development.

Knowledge, Skills, Abilities

1. University degree in related field.
2. At least 3 years of relevant professional experience in the field of humanitarian aid, development aid, conflict analysis, peace building and/or peace advocacy.
3. Qualified and experienced as DNH trainer, DNH and/or iPAD assessment facilitator, MSTC analysis facilitator.
4. Proven analysis, assessment, documentation and capacity building skills.
5. Outstanding inter-personal and cross-cultural communication skills. Ability to handle sensitive data with solid professional judgment and discretion. Ability to effectively lead assessment and training teams.
6. Ability to travel up to 40 % of time within the assigned geographic zone, and 1-2 times per year internationally.

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY *in* EMERGENCIES
Learning from the Asia Tsunami Response



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