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| Hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa June 11, 2002 Africa’s Weak States: U.S. Policy Options in Liberia Rory E. Anderson Africa Policy Advisor World Vision US Introduction Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Africa on the humanitarian situation and U.S. policy options in Liberia. My name is Rory Anderson, Africa Policy Advisor for World Vision, one of the largest, privately-funded international relief and development organizations in the U.S. Currently, World Vision implements more than 6,000 relief, rehabilitation and long-term development projects in 95 countries, and we have had an active presence in Liberia for almost 15 years. I. Background Mano River Region Since the late 1980s, sustained conflict in the Mano River basin has spread across borders and engulfed the region, culminating in a severe humanitarian crisis and sustained political instability. Internal wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s led to the exodus of more than one million refugees to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea over the course of the decade. In addition to refugees, an estimated one to two million people in the region have been internally displaced at the height of the various conflicts. Although Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone formed the Mano River Union economic pact in 1973, the conflicts of the past decade have severely strained political and economic relations between the three states. A struggle for control of diamond fields in Sierra Leone has been central to the crisis in recent years. Several failed peace accords and peacekeeping efforts, collapsed economies, and some of the worst human rights atrocities in recent history has made the Mano River crisis one of the world's most severe humanitarian disasters. Although 2001 brought improved security to Guinea and Sierra Leone, an upsurge in fighting in Liberia continues to threaten the stability of the entire region. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 1.1 million of the 15 million inhabitants of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continue to be either internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. Liberia Civil war in Liberia from 1989 to 1997 led to the collapse of its economy and left its infrastructure destroyed. Sustained fighting and human rights abuses by warring factions led to the exodus of an estimated 700,000 Liberian refugees to neighboring countries and an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons during the height of this conflict. In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected president by an exhausted country and with the support of the international community. Initial steps were taken to rebuild Liberia's infrastructure and to resettle refugees. However, since 1999, the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as much of the international community, have accused Charles Taylor of supporting anti-government forces in both Guinea and Sierra Leone and exchanging diamonds for guns. The Government of Liberia (GOL) has spent from 2001 until the present engaged in battles of their own with anti-government factions in northern Liberia. This continued fighting has lead to the internal displacement of thousands of Liberians, and caused many more to flee to Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. In May 2001, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in response to Charles Taylor’s involvement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, maintained an arms embargo on Liberia and imposed sanctions on diamond exports and international travel by GOL officials. II. A Complex Humanitarian Emergency Insecurity, Internally Displaced and Refugees Fighting in Liberia that was once confined to the northwestern county of Lofa, which borders Guinea and Sierra Leone, has now spread further south to within 25 miles of the capital, Monrovia. Clashes in late November and December between GOL troops and rebels identified as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Grand Cape Mount and Bong counties, caused the displacement of an estimated 4,000 Liberians. Due to heightened insecurity, World Vision was forced to withdraw relief assistance from Grand Cape Mount County. On December 20, LURD forces captured the northern Lofa County city of Zorzor. World Vision, in collaboration with other relief agencies in Liberia currently estimate that over 176,000 persons are internally displaced and have fled their homes to other parts of Liberia. Since October 1, the movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has remained fluid, particularly in and out of the Bopolu and Gemana camps following the recent outbreak of violence. In late December, relief agencies were planning on establishing transit centers for IDPs in the towns of Sawmill and Nyomo in Bomi County. Because public services are non-existent, relief agencies continue to provide the majority of assistance to IDPs. The resurgence of fighting over the past year has also created an influx of Liberian refugees into Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered an estimated 20,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone and 6,000 in Cote d'Ivoire since May 2001;3,400 have fled in this last week alone. Unconfirmed numbers of Liberian refugees have also arrived in Guinea throughout 2001, but have yet to be registered. Prior to 2001, UNHCR estimated that 80,000 Liberians were living in Guinea and 120,000 in Cote d'Ivoire. UNHCR also estimates there are still 70,000 Sierra Leonean refugees living in Liberia. III. World Vision in Liberia Overview In order to address the human suffering brought by the civil war, World Vision began the Liberia Emergency Response Program in 1988. The program was based in Lofa, Bong, Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties, but has shifted out of Lofa and Grand Cape Mount due to increasing political violence between the government forces and the LURD. Since it’s inception, World Vision’s work has had two components: 1) Basic healthcare delivery; Maternal/Child Health services, and 2) Agriculture rehabilitation of food production capacity. Both components mutually reinforce each other—with increased food production capacity, there is a corresponding improvement in nutrition and health. Likewise, by improving healthcare delivery systems through the renovation of medical clinics, and providing much needed medical supplies and primary health care, a healthier population has the capacity for food production and expanded economic activity. Health World Vision’s original health objectives were to provide supplies, supervision and management to 19 health facilities located in Lofa, Grand Cape Mount, and Bomi counties. With target beneficiaries of 128,500, World Vision catchments provided immunizations to 50% of pregnant and lactating women. In addition, we also helped to: · train certified midwives at clinics and in the bush · monitor weight/age of children under 5 · immunize children against childhood diseases (75% of children by age 3) · health education on a variety of subjects, including HIV/AIDS · Treat major health problems: malaria, diarrhea, acute respiratory infection We found that in our catchments, most people did not know how malaria or cough was contracted; 77% of women delivered at home, and only 10% of children were immunized. In addition, 60% of households drank unsafe creek or river water, and 75% of households do not have a toilet, multiplying the transmission of waterborne diseases. Causes for Scaling Back Although we have had good success in the past, World Vision has had to significantly scale back its health program for two reasons: increased violence and severe declines in U.S. government funding for health programs. Shortfalls in U.S. government funding will force World Vision to completely close our current health program by Sept 30, 2002. Agriculture World Vision’s agriculture program operated in the areas of Grand Cape Mount County; CARI, which is most of Bong County; Fumah, which is in parts of Bong and Margibi Counties; Monserrado, serving peri-urban areas outside of Monrovia; and parts of Lofa County. The program has had to retreat from two-thirds of that area due to violent conflict. WV’s agriculture program currently was serving 220 rural farming communities with improved seed and technology, and 250 communities with gardening inputs and technology. The major agricultural focus is to get area farmers back on their feet by producing their own food for their food security, and then helping them to sell any surplus, focusing on indigenous crops of rice, sweet potato, plantain, banana, yam, and expanded vegetable gardening. World Vision’s specific activities included: · Distribution of improved seeds and tools; · Technical assistance in organizing farmer groups for (1) agricultural education and (2) for communal production of improved seeds for distribution to the entire community; · Developing demonstration farm plots so that farmer groups can test agricultural methods for themselves (For farmers living on the margins, even improved seeds and techniques constitute a life and death risk with their food security and overall economic livelihood. Experimental plots give farmers verifiable assurances that new seeds and techniques work.) · Promotion of lowland rice production which is the most efficient, and productive, and damages the ecology the least; · Developing extensive improved seed production facilities and training selected farmers as apprentices; · Introducing improved species of animals to breed with local stock, since most animals were eaten by the soldiers during the civil war; · Introducing appropriate, small-scale agricultural machinery to improve efficiency and the initial processing of agricultural products for better storage, consumption and sale. Causes for Scaling Back As with our health program, because of continued violence, WV no longer operates in Lofa or Grand Cape Mount counties. Additionally, the CARI seed production facility, which provided seeds for World Vision’s target groups, was taken over by the GOL in the Fall of 2001. Declining U.S. government funds will probably force World Vision to lose its agriculture program by Sept. 30, 2002. IV. Humanitarian Crisis and the Links to Political and Regional Instability Population Displacement and Instability There are direct and immediate linkages between humanitarian crises involving large-scale population displacement and economic collapse to political and regional instability. Fear of violence is the most common reason why people flee their homes to seek safety elsewhere. In a region that has seen sustained violence and instability, the rise of human displacement in Liberia reinforces regional cycles of volatility. As of the first week of June 2002, current figures on accessible, internally displaced persons in Liberia have reached over 176,000. As mentioned above, refugee statistics are less definitive, largely due to border insecurity in both Guinea and Sierra Leone, but prior to 2001, there were over 80,000 Liberian refugees; with increased conflict, this number has surely increased. Women and their dependent children generally comprise more than 80% of refugees and displaced persons. The UN has said that, in humanitarian disasters, they bear "a disproportionate share of the suffering." Refugee women must provide for their children in an atmosphere in which their security is threatened and the likelihood of sexual violence is increased. Violence between government forces and the LURD has been the chief cause for Liberian displacement. Population displacement of this level creates instability in the following ways: · Economic collapse. In an agrarian society such as Liberia, removal from entitled land creates unemployment—farmers who once cultivated their own land now have no land to farm—as well as a serious food security crisis—farmers can no longer produce food, and have no gainful employment to purchase food. The production of rice, the main staple in Liberia, has been estimated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to meet only a third of the country's requirements. · Host communities and the displaced compete and sometimes conflict over scarce resources. Host communities that are already on the economic margins, now have to compete with a large influx of outsiders who also need access to scarce resources of land, healthcare, and education. Tensions can be further exacerbated between host communities and displaced populations when ethnic or political differences engender conflict. With lack of adequate aid, stable communities can quickly become part of conflict and instability as a swelling population competes for limited resources. Environmental destruction is also a result of a concentrated population in search of firewood and construction materials. · Combatants infiltrating camps. The majority of displaced persons live in camps, which should provide adequate levels of food, shelter, healthcare and education. However camps can become another source of instability because they often become havens for armed groups, who can easily hide weapons and infiltrate camps to receive food and medical care. The presence of combatants makes non-combatants targets for attacks by warring parties outside of the camps, and their presence increases the rate of sexual violence and forced conscription, especially of child soldiers. Theoretically, there should be an attempt to separate combatants from non-combatants as they enter into camps by interviewing persons as they enter. But camp staff are usually out-numbered by the populations that they are serving, often times by the thousands per every staff worker. Displaced populations may or may not be able to identify combatants within their midst, but most are all too often worried about their own security and are intimidated into remaining silent. Regional Trends The humanitarian crisis in Liberia is currently unfolding in a cycle of violence, local economic collapse, and large displacements of the population. These are symptoms of the following 6 regional trends: 1. Displaced, unemployed and mostly illiterate youth are vulnerable to military recruitment by state and non-state actors throughout the region. These child soldiers often become the most brutal perpetrators of violent acts. 2. Illegal mismanagement of natural resources, especially of diamonds and timber, draws on a largely unemployed adult population in the absence of industries, or a viable civil service. 3. The militarization of formerly non-combatant communities as they compete over scarce resources, makes them pawns for political actors ready to capitalize on ethinic or regional differences, further widening regional violence. 4. The trafficking of small arms in an unstable environment becomes a guaranteed source of power and income through banditry and further exploitation and trafficking of conflict diamonds, timber and other resources. 5. Increasing disregard for human life by both state and non-state actors, as reflected in the rise in the number and the degree of brutal acts of torture, rape, harassment and executions perpetrated against civilians--especially women and children--foments instability and sows the seeds for future discord and social and economic collapse. 6. Deterioration of basic infrastructure and services due to perpetual cycles of instability and violence makes resettlement of displaced populations and the restoration of economic activities like trade and agriculture very difficult. UN agencies such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP) are exhausting their resources and cannot stretch their resources any further. V. Declining U.S. Government Assistance Despite the expansion of a regional humanitarian crisis in the MRU, U.S. humanitarian assistance to Liberia has declined by 82% over the past 5 years. Since 1998, total U.S. government assistance to Liberia, including food aid, has declined to the following levels: · FY1998 - $37,786,000 · FY1999 - $16,049,000 · FY2000 - $17,529,000 · FY2001 - $8,199,000 · FY2002 - $6,519,000 This drastic decline in humanitarian assistance demonstrates unfortunate trends: (1) humanitarian assistance in the Mano River Union is a zero sum game, which means that there are only winners and losers—we take from Liberia and give to Sierra Leone, rather than having a balanced, regional approach to humanitarian assistance. And (2) policy makers in the U.S. have incorrectly politicized humanitarian assistance to Liberia. Instead, it is better to separate humanitarian assistance from our political strategy with Charles Taylor. Humanitarian assistance, especially when it is channeled through local and international relief agencies, has proven to be an effective tool for building strong civil society actors that can democratically challenge the political establishment while rebuilding societies and economies damaged by war. These are a long and medium-term investments, with long-term pay-offs. Starving an already volatile region, or unevenly distributing aid--i.e., investing in Sierra Leone, and not in Liberia or Guinea, simply creates a merry-go-round of violence and displacement, shifting war from one country to the next. VI. Conclusions and Recommendations Increased violence between the GOL and the LURD has caused severe displacement in Liberia and could eventually disrupt the fragile peace in Sierra Leone as displaced Liberians seek asylum. Sierra Leone itself has recently emerged from an 11 year conflict; an influx of Liberian refugees and possible combatants competing for resources, has the potential of widening the Liberian conflict and sending Sierra Leone back into war. More war in the Mano River Union is not going to resolve the existing war. Unified and serious diplomatic initiatives, especially lead by the U.S. and the U.K. who have already demonstrated diplomatic leadership in Sierra Leone, should continue by initiating a mechanism to channel whatever compromises that Charles Taylor and other combatants may be willing to make into a process that is more constructive than conflict. Humanitarian assistance to the region should also increase to diffuse the potential for conflict within communities and among the MRU nations. Over the past 2 years, World Vision and other agencies have seen an increase in aid to Sierra Leone, but there has been a rapid decrease in aid to Liberia, which, ultimately, undermines the total US government investment in the region. Total US government assistance to Liberia went from $37.7 million in FY 1998 to $6.5 million for FY 2002; an 82% decrease in just 5 years. The rapid decline and current restructuring of U.S. government assistance is forcing World Vision and other international aid agencies to completely close down operations by the end of this fiscal year. Declining humanitarian assistance does not affect political change, but, rather, gives incentives for conflict and instability over scarce public resources. Sustained diplomatic leadership, coupled with increased and evenly dispersed humanitarian assistance among the 3 countries will bring about long-term stability, which will eventually give way to indigenous political change in Liberia, which will provide a peace dividend for the entire Mano River Union. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present this testimony. |  |
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